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PROLOGUE 
 
The financial sector in general is a difficult industry to regulate, as there is a need to 
balance the competing interests of the various stakeholders. Tampering with the 
cornerstone of the capitalist system naturally arouses diverging views and is often the 
subject of many debates as is evidenced by the debates surrounding the National Credit 
Act (‘NCA’)1.  Nonetheless, its regulation can be a weapon to fight against poverty and 
inequality as evidenced by the purposes of the NCA. 
 
The object of this research is to analyse the law on debt review, focusing on the credit 
provider’s right contained in s 86(10) of the NCA to terminate the debt review process. 
The passage below contextualises the legal problem that this thesis analyses and seeks to 
address.2 
 
Ben is a 35-year-old estate agent whose salary has recently been reduced and is now 
without a commission. Between him and his spouse, they have 27 credit accounts. Their 
accounts include 14 credit cards, 6 personal loans, a home loan, a vehicle finance loan, a 
SARS debt; three store accounts and a municipal account (rates, water and lights). His 
spouse is still employed however; a salary of R 10, 000 cannot service all their accounts 
and pay for their living expenses.  
 
It has been three months since they have been able to service their debts. Ben applies for 
debt review in order to ease his financial burden. The debt counselor accepts Ben’s debt 
review application and a debt restructuring proposal will be drafted. The debt counselor 
deals directly with all Ben’s credit providers however most of them are uncooperative. 
His debt counselor informs him that she is struggling to obtain information from them, 
most of them do not respond to her requests. Meanwhile, Ben has been receiving calls 
                                                             
1 32 of 2005.  
2 The story is adapted from Consumer Fair December 2012/January 2013 page 4. 
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and letters threatening legal action from his credit providers. Since the credit providers 
are unresponsive, his debt counselor draws up a debt restructure proposal based on the 
information he has supplied to her. Some credit providers reject the proposal but do not 
make any constructive suggestions while others simply do not respond. His debt 
counselor is frustrated and decides to refer the matter to the local Magistrates’ Court 
without their input. 60 days have lapsed since Ben applied for debt review, as such in 
accordance with the NCA; one of his credit providers decides to terminate the debt 
review. As a result of this, the credit provider is able to enforce its agreements despite 
Ben having applied for debt review. 
 
Ben’s predicament is one that many South Africans are faced with due to the rapidly 
increasing cost of living, their low income and easily extended credit facilities. The 
legislature acknowledged this and thus created a new profession and a procedure that 
would assist the consumers.  
 
Primary goals of the research. 
 
The specific goals of the research are as follows: 
1) Determine the environment/context of operation of debt review;  
2) Identify whether s 86(10) of the NCA is of vital for the achievment of the 
purpose and object of the debt review process and the NCA; 
3) Consider the judgment of Collet v Firstrand Bank3 in light of the obstacles to 
debt review; and precedent on limitation clauses and good faith in South Africa; 
4) Make recommendations.  
 
 
 
                                                             
3 (2011) (4) SA 508 (SCA). 
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Methods, procedure and techniques. 
 
In order to answer the research question, an in-depth analysis of the relevant statutes, 
background documents, relevant research and case law will assist in determing the 
principles and values that underlie the Act. In addition, the Constitution will be the 
yardstick upon which the provision is considered in accordance with the principle of 
constitutional supremacy which South Africa subscribes to.  
The process of interpretation articulated in the Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v 
Endumeni Municipality4 will be employed when placing s 86(10) in its proper context. 
This process requires one to look at surrounding circumstances and the object and scope 
of legislation in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature. 
 
Structure of the research. 
 
Chapter 1 discusses consumer credit law in South Africa in general. It summarises the 
legislative framework that governed the consumer credit market before the NCA. It also 
discusses the landscape of the consumer credit market by discussing some of the relevant 
characteristics of the South African population. The chapter also contains a discussion of 
the essential aspects of consumer regulation. In concluding, it discusses the NCA, and 
defines the concept of over indebtedness and the debt review process. 
Chapter 2 discusses the previous means of debt review provided for by the Magistrates’ 
Court Act5 (“MCA”) and the Insolvency Act6. It will also examine the means of debt 
review contained in the NCA. By discussing the previous regime of debt review, the 
research will highlight the weaknesses of that old regime and assesses whether the NCA 
has rectified such weaknesses. 
 Chapter 3 contains a summary and analysis of the leading case on s 86(10), Collet. It 
considers the obstacles to debt review and the law on limitation clauses and good faith in 
                                                             
4 2012 ZASCA 13. 
5 Act 32 of 1944. 
6 Act 24 of 1936. 
 6 
light of the NCA and Collet judgment. In concluding, it considers whether the National 
Credit Act Amendment7 addresses the shortfalls highlighted. 
Chapter 4 discusses the recommendations in light of this research. The chapter will 
discuss the possible amendments to the provision, in addition to its removal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 No. 19 of 2014. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUMER CREDIT MARKET 
 
1.1 Historical recount of the South African Financial sector.   
 
Since 1994, the South African government has been dedicated to playing a leading and 
enabling role towards achieving economic transformation.8 The consumer credit industry 
was placed on the government’s agenda as an industry that needed regulation in order to 
unlock economic benefits and achieving of equality whilst minimising social and 
economic costs.9  Accordingly, the government envisioned a regulated credit market as a 
means by which it could address the structural legacy which resulted in discrimination 
against a large section of the population, the historically disadvantaged.10 
 
The South African financial sector was characterised by the existence of a formal and 
informal financial sector. The highly developed formal financial sector served primarily 
the middle and high-income earners who were predominantly white consumers and large 
enterprises.11 The large, informal financial market serviced by micro-lenders, loan sharks 
and pawnbrokers served the low-income ,and historically disadvantaged consumers.12 
The “prime market” that serviced the middle and high-income and predominantly white 
and large enterprises was serviced at moderate rates whilst the “marginal market” was 
serviced by an interest rate higher than the usury cap.13 
 
                                                             
8 Department of Trade and Industry ‘South Africa Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for 
Consumer Credit’, August 2004, available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/2005/050608consumer.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2015, 7. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 KM Louw ‘Prevention and alleviation of consumer over-indebtedness’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 200 at 
203. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The Department of Trade and Industry ‘Credit Law Review Summary of the finding of the technical 
committee’, August 2003, available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/publications/Background_NCA_docs/Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf, accessed on 
12 February 2015, 4. 
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Since 1994 there has been a large increase in over-indebtedness as a result of increased 
access to financial services by historically disadvantaged consumers.14 In addition, the 
transformation of the civil service, affirmative action and aspirational borrowing led to 
reckless granting of credit.15  As a result of over-indebtedness, a significant percentage 
of personal income is used to service micro-lending debt, leaving little for the borrower 
to pay for household expenses.16  
 
Even after 1994, a large portion of historically disadvantaged consumers continued to be 
excluded from the formal financial market. As a result they were forced to access 
finance, particularly credit, through the informal financial market because they were still 
considered a high risk and generally did not own assets that could serve as security for 
their loans.17 As a result of the legislation, or the lack thereof, Campbell states that the 
industry spiralled out of control, growing rapidly year-on-year.18 The industry grew by 
30 per cent per year and the industry disbursements more than doubled in three years 
between September 2003 and August 2006.19  
 
1.2. The shortfalls of the old legislative regime.  
 
Before the enactment of the NCA, the financial market was regulated by the Credit 
Agreements Act20 and the Usury Act21. The former covered the contractual aspects of 
credit agreements in connection with the sale and lease of movable goods. While the 
latter covered financial aspects of money lending contracts, leasing contracts of movable 
goods, rendering of services and sale of movables. Consumer regulation prior to 1994 
responded in large part to the problems faced by consumers in the prime market, as a 
                                                             
14 Louw op cit (n12) 204. 
15 Louw op cit (n12)  203. 
16 J Campbell The Cost of Credit in the Micro-finance Industry in South Africa (LLM thesis, Rhodes 
University, 2006) 77. 
17 Louw op cit (n12) 203. 
18 J Campbell “The Excessive Cost of Credit on Small Money Loans under the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005” 2007 19 SA Merc LJ 251 at 252. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Act 75 of 1980. 
21 Act 73 of 1968. 
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result it did not accommodate the changes in income distribution, increase in black 
spending power and many new entrants into the consumer market.22 
 
The existence of the various pieces of legislation resulted in a lack of uniformity in the 
credit market as there were different levels of protection afforded by the Acts leaving 
room for misrepresentation in regard to the disclosure requirements and abuse of the 
provisions of the Acts. 23  The serious inconsistency in the enforcement of credit 
transactions led to irregularities and abuse of the consumer especially in the informal 
market, this was perpetuated by inconsistency in the interpretation of the Acts by the 
courts thereby undermining consumer protection.24 The interest caps required by the 
Acts were dysfunctional, credit providers could change them to include credit life 
insurance, loan application fees, administrative fees, club fees and various bank fees.25 
As a result the cost of credit would increase up to even three times above the limit set by 
the Acts. 26  This discouraged reputable credit providers from providing affordable 
finance to low-income earners.27 
 
Under this credit regime, the lack of disclosure, marketing and credit advertisement were 
misleading and insufficiently regulated and as a result the consumer’s ability to make 
informed decisions about credit agreements was impaired.28 In addition, the rate of credit 
activity created a risk of over-indebtedness which could impact the creation of wealth or 
aggravate vulnerability and poverty. 29  The credit bureaux also reported many 
irregularities which indicated a need for increased regulation and credit information.30 
                                                             
22   Department of Trade and Industry ‘Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework’ 9 
September 2004, available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26774_1.pdf, accessed on 12 
February 2015, page 11. 
23 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 23. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 12. 
26 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 13. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 27. 
29 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 19. 
30 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 17. 
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At the time of enactment of these pieces of legislation there were no credit cards, and 
access to home loans and micro-loans was limited. Evidently, the credit market had 
evolved beyond what the drafters of the legislation had envisaged. In addition, 
globalisation highlighted the fact there was a need to modernise the consumer credit 
laws and to harmonise them with international best practice.31 
 
1.3 The South African credit market landscape. 
 
Consumer credit regulation is based on the assumption ‘that the law will be observed or 
that if it is not, the offender will be brought to book whether by civil action, by 
prosecution or by some administrative sanction.’32  This assumption is based on the 
presupposition ‘that the law will be tolerably well known and understood and that those 
who need to invoke it will have ready access to the legal system and willingness to be 
able to use it.’33 During the course of this discussion it will be come clear that the debt 
review process in terms of NCA is lacking in this regard because s 86(10) acts as a 
limitation to the consumer’s right of access to court. Furthermore, the remedy provided 
for by the Act, in particular debt review although is well known, is not clearly 
understood. 
 
The aims of the NCA illustrate that the legislature sought to have a framework that is 
tailored to the South African landscape.  The fragmented legislation that governed the 
South African credit market is not unique to her alone; Goode states that universally 
where there was legislation, this pattern existed.34 As such South Africa’s uniqueness is 
not the state of this outdated legislation but rather the characteristics of her people, in 
particular the historically disadvantaged individuals.  
 
                                                             
31 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 13. 
32 RM Goode Consumer Credit (1978) page 4.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Goode op cit (n33) 9. 
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1.3.1 The use of credit in South Africa. 
 
At the time of the drafting of the Policy Framework for Consumer Credit in 2004, the 
credit market was worth R362 billion, providing credit to approximately 15 million 
people and with the 2008 economic crisis these numbers increased drastically.35 ‘During 
the 2013/2014 financial year, the total value of the south Africa’s gross debtors book 
amounted to nearly 1,55 trillion with 21.71 million credit active consumers.’36 44,2 per 
cent, amounting to 9,60 million credit active consumers and  329,000 less than in the last 
quarter, of whom had impaired credit records.37 This number is reflective of the negative 
macro-economic conditions South African consumers are facing. A narrow focus on 
indebtedness only will provide an incomplete picture because the significant increases in 
the cost of living is a factor to consider when determining why consumer’s default on 
their debts that they could previously service. 
 
The credit market is dominated by secured lending in particular motor vehicle finance 
which constitued of 35 per cent.38 Mortgages consisted of 29.2 per cent of the credit 
market while unsecured and credit facilities counted for 17.8 per cent and 15.4 per cent 
respectively.39 The number of credit consumers and the value of the credit market in 
South Africa is indicative of the fact that it has its benefits, and is greatly depended on 
by the population. Although it does come at a cost in the form of an interest rate, it 
allows consumers to purchase products that they would otherwise not be able to afford, 
and thus unlocks a diverse range of opportunities that allow for an improvement in 
standard of living.40 Credit allows the consumer to purchase items such as cars, houses 
and pay for education, especially tertiary education. 
                                                             
35 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 6. 
36  National Credit Regulator ‘Annual Report 2013/2014’, available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/publications/NCR%20AR%202014%20lr.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2015, page 
34. 
37 National Credit Regulator op cit (n37) 37. 
38 National Credit Regulator op cit (n37) 35. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Department of Trade Industry op cit (n9) 7. 
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1.3.2 Income and expenditure of South African households. 
 
Although the Statistics South Africa income and expenditure of households survey 
results from 2010/2011 are outdated, they provide an understanding of South African 
households’ financial position. According to these findings, black households which 
accounted for more than three quarters of the total numbers of households in the country 
earned less than half (44,6 per cent) of the total annual household income.41 White 
households made up of 12.4 per cent of the total households and earned 40.1 per cent of 
the total income.42 Coloured households accounted for 8.5 per cent of the households 
and earned 9.9 per cent of the total income whereas; Indian/Asian household accounted 
for 2.5 per cent of the households and earned 5.4 per cent of the total annual income.43  
 
The average household income across all households was R 119 542 per annum; 
however, the average was lower among black African households (R 69 632).44 The 
average was higher among coloured (R 139 190), Indian/Asian (R 252 724) and white (R 
387 011) households.45  All populations made significant real gains in average annual 
consumption expenditure in comparison to 2005/2006 period in which, Indian/Asian-
headed households had the biggest gains in both Rand value and percentage (R 57 443 
and 40.7 per cent).46 Black African-headed households had the second largest percentage 
gain of 35 per cent, but the smallest increase in Rand value of R 14 510.47 White-headed 
households had the smallest percentage increase (16.1 per cent) that translated to R 43 
711. 48  The growth illustrates that the black middle class is slowly getting richer; 
                                                             
41 Statistics South Africa ‘Income and Expenditure of households 2010/2011 Statistical Release P0100’,  6 
November 2012, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications2/statsabout.asp?PPN=P0100&SCH=, accessed on 12 February 
2015, page 11. 
42 Statistics South Africa  op cit (n42) 11. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Statistics South Africa op cit (n42) 12. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Statistics South Africa  op cit (n42) 4. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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however, there is still a tremendous gap between the population groups.49 White-headed 
households on average earn more than 5.5 times the income of the average black 
African-headed household as a result inequality still remains a serious challenge for 
South Africa.50  
 
‘The average household income per annum for male-households was R 151 186, while 
for female-headed households this average was far lower at R 70 830.’51 72.7 per cent of 
all household income is derived from work; this was true for 75.7 per cent of all income 
for male-headed households but only 62.8 per cent for female-headed households.52 For 
female-headed households, pensions, social insurance and family allowances accounted 
for a 10.9 per cent of all households’ income while 9.1 per cent came from income from 
individuals outside of households or income not elsewhere classified.53  
 
‘Every second adult in South Africa receives a salary or wage, including those who work 
full-time (29 per cent), those who work part-time (15 per cent) and some of those who 
have piece jobs (11 per cent).’54 Money from others (friends and family) is a source of 
income for a third of adults, 29 per cent receive a government grant whereas 7 per cent 
of adults in South Africa do not receive money at all.55 Considering that 46 per cent of 
adults in South Africa receive less than R 3,000 a month and that the average household 
consists of four people with one or two people contributing to the household income, it 
is no surprise that 23 per cent of adults stated that their household financial situation is 
worse than the previous year.56 Many South Africans experience financial strain because 
of relatively low personal income, slow economic growth and rising inflation, fuel and 
                                                             
49 Statistics South Africa  op cit (n42) 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Statistics South Africa  op cit (n42) 12. 
52 Statistics South Africa  op cit (n42) 13. 
53 Ibid. 
54Credit and borrowing in South Africa Finscope Consumer survey South Africa 2012, available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/press_release/research_reports/NCR_14.03.2013.pdf, accessed  on 12 February 
2015, 11. 
55Ibid. 
56 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 13. 
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food prices.57 This led to an increase in borrowing behavior and decrease in savings as 
such the reasons for borrowing are closely related to the economic challenges people 
experience.58 
 
1.3.3 Education. 
 
41 per cent of the South African population comprises of adults59 younger than 30 years, 
37 per cent of them have matric and a further 39 per cent have some high school 
education.60 Although there has been an improvement in educational levels61, the legacy 
of systematic dispossession and under investment in education for black South Africans 
has had a fundamental impact on credit market, which exacerbates existing imbalances.62 
After 1994, many of the new entrants to the marketplace were still vulnerable, with 
limited-skills, high levels of illiteracy and poverty exacerbating the conventional 
information asymmetries and imbalances in bargaining power.63 
 
1.3.4 Historically disadvantaged individuals. 
 
In order to understand the South African credit market, one must understand the lives of 
the historical disadvantaged individuals64.  Considering the Living Standard Measure65 
which combines a range of assets or lack thereof and area classification, results in 39 per 
cent of adults in South Africa being classified as HDI, living in non-metropolitan areas 
and coming from households classified as LSM 1-5.66 Although a majority of adults (52 
per cent) are within the LSM 5-6, 21 per cent (7.2 million) adults are within LSM 1-4 
                                                             
57Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 12 
58 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 13. 
59 An adult being 16 years or older. 
60 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 11. 
61 There are more people with matric. 
62 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 9. 
63 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 11. 
64 Hereafter referred to as HDI. Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 3 defines an HDI as  
adults 16 years and older, LSM 1-5, residing in non-metro areas.  
65 Hereafter referred to as LSM  
66Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 14.  
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which entails that they face considerable vulnerabilities such as limited access to 
infrastructure for example water, sanitation and electricity in addition to absence of 
access to the credit market.67 
 
 The HDI age distribution is as follows: 5 per cent is between the ages of 16-17 years, 42 
per cent is between the ages of 18 and 29 years, 28 per cent is between the ages of 30 
and 44 years, 14 per cent is between the ages of 45 and 59 year; and 11 per cent is over 
the age of 60 years.68 53 per cent of the HDI population is female with the reminder 
constituting the male population.69  
 
1.3.5 Financial Inclusion. 
 
Financial inclusion which describes the extent to which the adult population engages 
with financial products and services such as; saving, transaction banking, credit 
insurance, whether formal or informal has increased from 73 per cent in 2011 to 81 per 
cent in 2012.70 Looking at the gender divide, women are more likely to be financially 
included than men (84 per cent and 77 per cent respectively), which is largely as a result 
of the South African Social Security Agency paying out grants into their bank 
accounts.71  
 
The levels of financial inclusion are lower among HDI, 56 per cent are formally served 
including those who use one or more traditional financial products supplied by banks (49 
per cent) and/or have other formal non-bank products and services (52 per cent).72 42 per 
cent of the HDI have or use informal mechanisms to manage their finances while 32 per 
                                                             
67 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) I8. 
68 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54)  14. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 16. 
71 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 17. 
72 Ibid. 
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cent are financially excluded.73 These figures are as a result of the lack of access to 
infrastructure, the banks, transportation and low income.  29 per cent of the adults who 
use financial products and services, have credit or loan products, this figure is 
significantly lower for HDI (21 per cent).74 In 2012, the number of credit active adults 
had reduced significantly from 2010 and 2011 (12 per cent and 27 per cent 
respectively).75  
 
The HDI financial services consumption is distributed as follows: 10 per cent of the 
borrowing occurs from family or friends, 5 per cent from store cards, 3 per cent 
borrowing from a stokvel76 or society and 1 per cent borrowing each from an employer, 
bank, local spaza, mashonisa77 or colleague.78  
 
1.4 Essential aspects of the new consumer regulation. 
  
 
Legislative control of consumer credit is a phenomenon that emerged at the end of the 
nineteenth century as a result of technological development and a gradual reaction 
against the laissez—faire philosophy previously prevailing.79 Thus, consumer credit law 
in South Africa has the privilege of adopting the best practices.  
 
‘Consumer protection is an integral part of a modern, efficient, effective and just market 
place.’80 As discussed above the South African credit landscape is unique as a result of 
the effects of the apartheid legacy that are still prevalent. Consumer policy in South 
                                                             
73 Ibid. 
74 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 20. 
75 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 19. 
76 Stokvel is an informal savings club with other people. Financial Diaries ‘Investigation the financial lives 
of the poor: findings in brief’, available at 
http://www.financialdiaries.com/files/Findings%20in%20brief.pdf, accessed 20 February 2014. 
77 Xhosa translation for moneylender. Mashonisa are township lenders who lends out his/her own money 
for profit. Financial Diaries supra (n76). 
78 Credit and borrowing in South Africa op cit (n54) 20. 
79 Goode op cit (n33) 5. 
80 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 4. 
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Africa must promote the ‘equitable consumption of goods and provide vulnerable 
consumers with rights.’81  The cornerstones of South African consumer policy are the 
constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination therefore every provision in 
such legislation must promote these two principles.82 The ideal South African consumer 
policy and law reform must be able to address not only this but must also be able to 
respond to new emerging challenges and opportunities.83 ‘Increased cross border trade, 
e-commerce and other new trading methods resulting from globalization and 
technological advancement require the government to find innovative ways to protect 
and promote the interests of consumers.’84 
 
 The NCA was enacted to provide an answer to this problem however, whether it is a 
responsive, flexible, simple legislative and regulatory framework is a contentious issue 
that is a consideration in this discourse.85 The new legislative regime ought to have 
provided for credible and easily accessible enforcement mechanisms especially to 
vulnerable and rural consumers providing for access to advice, counselling and legal 
support in general.86 Consumer protection geared at providing effective enforcement and 
redress must ensure that there are awareness and education programs, early warning 
systems, dispute resolution and complaints handling system. 87  Enacting current and 
revolutionary consumer policy was not only as a result of the above-discussed factors 
but also a means to put into effect international guidelines and principles such as the 
United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection. 88   Furthermore, it was also a 
response to the growing global consumer rights movement that continues to gain 
momentum. 
 
                                                             
81 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 9. 
82 Ibid 
83 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 4. 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid. 
86 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 6. 
87 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 7. 
88 Department of Trade and Industry op cit (n22) 9. 
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1.5 The National Credit Act. 
 
The extensive credit law review process began in 2002 and resulted in the NCA that was 
signed into law by the President on 15 March 2006.  Majority of the provisions in the 
Act were effective on 1 June and 1 September 2006.89 The NCA has a much broader 
application and seeks to provide more extensive protection than the previous legislative 
regime. The Act seeks to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans, and to promote a fair, transparent, competitive, efficient, sustainable, 
responsible, and accessible credit market for all, particularly those who have historically 
been unable to access credit sustainable market conditions.90 In addition, it prohibits 
unfair credit marketing practices, and provides for improvement of consumer credit 
information. 91  The Act encourages responsible borrowing, discourages over-
indebtedness and reckless lending and provides for a consistent and harmonized system 
of debt restructuring enforcement and judgment.92 The Act sets out to provide a single 
legislative regime for all credit agreements, however, it acknowledges their inherent 
differences and attempts to accommodate them.  
 
The purposes of the Act that are important for this research are as follows:  
i. Dealing with and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of 
satisfaction by the consumer of all his or her responsible financial 
obligations;93 
ii. Providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of 
disputes that arise from credit agreement;94 
                                                             
89 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006. 
90 S 3. 
91 Preamble of the NCA.  
92 S 3(c) (i) and 3(i) 
93 S 3(g). 
94 S 3(h). 
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iii. Providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, 
enforcement and judgment, that places greater importance on the eventual 
satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligation incurred under credit 
agreements.95 
 
Chapter 4 of the Act discusses consumer credit policy and addresses over-indebtedness 
and reckless credit in Part D. Of importance to this discourse are debt review, over-
indebtedness and s 86(10). In terms of s 79, over-indebtedness occurs when a consumer 
is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under the credit 
agreements having regard to various factors. 
Whereas debt review can be defined as the process by which a debt counsellor may 
declare a consumer as being over-indebted and obtains a court order by the Magistrates’ 
Court confirming:96 
a. The declaration of reckless credit for credit agreements and/or 
b. Re-structure obligations under credit agreements by- 
i. Extending the period of the arrangement of the agreement and reducing the amount of 
each payment due accordingly; 
ii. Postponing, during a specified period, the dates on which payments are due under the 
agreement; 
iii. Extending the period of the agreement and postponing, during a specified period, the 
dates on which payments are due under the agreements; 
iv. Recalculating the consumer’s obligations because of contraventions of unlawful 
agreements and provisions,  disclosure, form and effect of credit agreements or 
collection and repayment practices. 
 
Section 86(10), states that 
‘If a consumer is in default under a credit agreement that is being reviewed in terms of this 
section, the credit provider in respect of that credit agreement may give notice to terminate the 
review in the prescribed manner to-  
( a )   the consumer;  
( b )   the debt counsellor; and   
( c )   the National Credit Regulator,  
                                                             
95 S 3(i) 
96 S 86(7)(c)(i) and (ii). 
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at any time at least 60 business days after the date on which the consumer applied for the debt 
review.’  
 
The validity and interpretation of s 86(10) of the NCA has been confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the Collet judgment. The confusion that existed amongst 
the lower court judges in matters concerning this provision has been cleared. However, 
this decision ought to be in line with the precedent and the purpose and the object of the 
Act. The binding force of the Collet judgment could have disastrous effects if it was 
incorrectly decided and could potentially defeat the purpose of having a statute that 
rectifies the imbalances that existed between the consumer and credit provider; and 
provides for debt review in the manner it does. 
Prior to the enactment of the NCA, there was a need for legislation that fully appreciated 
the level of over-indebtedness in the country. The new legislation had to strike a balance 
between the need to ensure that credit providers did not abuse the system and cheat 
consumers and the need for credit providers not only to recover their capital but also to 
make a profit. This is the background against which s 86(10) must be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
CHAPTER 2 
DEBT REVIEW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 METHODS OF DEBT REVIEW. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 many poor South Africans have been enticed in the recent 
years to enter into credit agreements that they could not afford. Thus debt review 
provides an invaluable service that is instrumental in curbing this.  
Since the enactment of the NCA, s 86 has been scrutinised. Naturally, a procedure that 
potentially could prevent one from enforcing its rights, or allow for restructuring 
obligations under a credit agreement, would attract the attention it has. Procedural clarity 
has been the central theme of most cases concerning debt review.  
On a plain reading of s 86, debt review is a process by which a debt counsellor may 
declare a consumer as being over-indebted97 and obtains a court order by the MCA 
confirming: 
c. The declaration of reckless credit for credit agreements and/or 
d. Re-structure obligations under credit agreements by- 
v. Extending the period of the arrangement of the agreement and reducing the amount of 
each payment due accordingly; 
vi. Postponing during a specified period the dates on which payments are due under the 
agreement; 
vii. Extending the period of the agreement and postponing during a specified period the 
dates on which payments are due under the agreements; 
viii. Recalculating the consumer’s obligations because of contraventions of unlawful 
agreements and provisions 98 ,  disclosure, form and effect of credit agreements 99  or 
collection and repayment practices100. 
 
                                                             
97 As defined in Chapter 1. 
98 Chapter 5 Part A. 
99 Chapter 5 Part B. 
100 Chapter 6 Part A. 
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Some writers are of the view that the NCA introduces new forms of assistance to debtors 
who are over-committed.101  Debt review is not a new concept in South Africa. Although 
debt review was not addressed in either the Usury Act or Credit Agreements Act, the 
MCA and the Insolvency Act make provision for similar procedures as discussed below. 
 
2.2 VOLUNTARY RE-ARRANGEMENT. 
  
This process allows a debtor faced with debt problems and its creditor(s) to reach a 
compromise or private arrangement for repayment of a debt(s) over a specified time 
period which would result in partial or full discharge.102 It is also referred to as voluntary 
distribution in the case where it results in rescheduling of payments.103 It is a voluntary 
process and creditors cannot be compelled to enter or participate in this process. This is 
arguably the oldest form of debt review which manifests itself in different aspects of 
commercial law and industry. 
 
Voluntary arrangement can be employed before the debt collections procedures in the 
MCA are employed. Under the NCA, voluntary rearrangement is not prohibited and can 
be employed by the parties to the credit agreement before an application for debt review 
and once the application is rejected as discussed below. Over the years voluntary 
rearrangement has played a key role in assisting over-indebted consumers and thus 
evolved to become an essential component in debt collection and possibly dispute 
resolution.104  
As a result of the fact that it is a voluntary process, it is susceptible to abuse. A power 
imbalance between the parties and absence of regulation were the key challenges to 
                                                             
101 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained 2ed (2010) 3, C van Heerden in JW Scholtz et al Guide to 
the National Credit Act (2008) par 11-2. 
102 A Boraine in M Kelly-Louw, JP Nehf and P Rott The future of consumer credit regulation (2008) 195. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Boraine op cit (n102) 195 states that “such an arrangement may follow mediation or other assistance 
rendered by an attorney or a paralegal.  
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effective voluntary arrangement. The need for statutory debt review was therefore 
evident. 
 
2.3 FINANCIAL INQUIRY IN TERMS OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT ACT. 
 
Sections 57 and 58 of the MCA provide for means by which a defendant (consumer in 
terms of the NCA) would make payments in instalments. Procedures in terms of s 65, 
65A, 65J and 74 of the MCA, require a financial enquiry and to this extent amount to 
debt review.  Sections 57 and 58 deal with an admission of liability and consent to 
judgment in the Magistrates’ Court, s 65 deals with debt collection while s 74 addresses 
the procedure for administration orders. Unlike the s 57 procedure, s 58, 65 and 74 are 
court based procedures, which are time consuming. Nonetheless, the procedures provide 
some assistance to over-indebted debtors.  
Although the above mentioned sections act as means of debt review, the MCA aims to 
consolidate and amend the law relating to the Magistrates’ Court and not to provide for 
such means.105 Providing debt review is not an aim of the MCA as envisioned by the 
NCA, it is a coincidence that by providing for means of debt collection, debt review 
occurs. 
 
2.3.1 Section 57 and 58. 
 
The procedures contained in the above mentioned sections essentially codified 
alternatives to the common law settlement procedures.106  Section 57 allows a debtor to 
make an undertaking to pay either a lump sum or instalment after making a written 
admission of liability. The debtor either admits liability for the entire debt claimed or 
another amount upon receipt of letter of demand or service of summons. If a debtor fails 
                                                             
105 Preamble of the MCA. 
106  S Pete, D Hume, M du Plessis and R Palmer Civil Procedure: A practical guide 2ed (2011) 373. 
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to meet it’s obligation, the creditor may obtain judgment against it.107 In terms of s 58, a 
debtor upon receipt of a letter of demand or service of summons demanding payment of 
a debt, consents in writing to judgment for amount of debt and costs claims. The plaintiff 
will be able to request a judgment against the defendant for the amount of the debt and 
costs.   
 
Both procedures are quick, simple and cheap in comparison to the other means of debt 
review.  In addition, the absence of a jurisdictional limit for the procedures entails that 
an over-indebted debtor can obtain debt rearrangement for all debts where it has received 
a letter of debt or has been served summons as long as the jurisdictional requirement of 
the Magistrates’ Court are met. 
 
2.3.2 Section 65. 
  
Section 65108 provides for a financial inquiry after the court has given judgment for the 
payment of a sum of money but before the issue of a notice under s 65A (1).  The section 
requires that the judgment debtor makes a written offer to the judgment creditor to pay 
the judgment debt in specified instalments or otherwise. Upon receiving such an offer, 
the judgment creditor or its attorney have the option of accepting it. If accepted, the clerk 
of the court, at the written request of the judgment creditor or its attorney, accompanied 
by the offer, orders the judgment debtor to pay the judgment debt in accordance with its 
offer or in specified instalments. Such order shall be deemed to be an order of the court 
mentioned in s 65A (1). 
 
The above mentioned financial inquiry is a means of debt review as it allows for 
variation of a judgment debtor’s instalment amounts by means of a written offer which 
                                                             
107 S 57(2) sets out the steps taken by the registrar or the clerk in the Regional Magistrates’ Court and the 
Magistrates’ Court in order to enter judgment against the debtor (defendant).  
108 S 65 substituted by s 2 of Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act 63 of 1976. 
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can be varied by the judgment creditor or its attorney. This is only achieved through 
mutual consent following an indirect inquiry into the prevailing circumstances of the 
judgment debtor. This procedure is both cost and time effective as it occurs before the 
issue of a notice in terms of s 65A (1) which is discussed below and is handled 
administratively by the clerk of the court, therefore requiring limited court time.  
 
2.3.3 Section 65A (1). 
 
Section 65A(1)  allows for a judgment debtor to be summoned by a notice to appear 
before the court in chambers on a specified date, in order for the court to enquire into its 
financial position and make an order as it deems just and equitable. Before engaging in 
this procedure, two requirements need to be fulfilled. Firstly, the court must have given 
judgment for the payment of a sum of money or payment in specified instalments. 
Secondly, such judgment or order must have remained unsatisfied for a period of ten 
days from the date on which it was given, or on which it became payable, or from the 
expiry of the period of suspension ordered in terms of s 48(e). 
  
On the day stated in the s 65A(1) notice, a judgment debtor who appears before the court 
presents oral evidence relevant to its financial situation. Sections 65D (4) (a) and (b) 
further states the factors that are considered when judging its ability to pay a debt. These 
factors include the nature of the debtor’s income, amounts needed for necessary 
expenses, and the amounts needed to make periodical payments in terms of other court 
orders or other commitments. 
 
Section 65D(5) states that the court has the discretion to refuse to take into account 
periodical payments made by the debtor in terms of a credit agreement, as defined in s 1 
of the NCA. In such a case a complete picture of the judgment debtor’s relevant 
financial circumstances is not taken into account. Failure to take into account the 
judgment debtor’s obligations in terms of such an agreement undermines the purpose of 
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having a procedure such as this. Effective debt review requires an accurate calculation of 
the judgment debtor’s disposable income thereafter an amount to be paid to creditor can 
be determined. 
 
2.3.4 Section 65J. 
 
Section 65J provides for an emoluments attachment order which entails that the court 
may order the employer of a judgment debtor (the garnishee) to pay a certain amount of 
the judgment debtor’s salary on a regular basis to the judgment creditor. Sections 65J (2) 
(a) and (b) require that that the judgment debtor consents to the emoluments attachment 
in writing. In addition, the judgment creditor or an appointed attorney must file with the 
clerk of the court an affidavit or an affirmation indicating the amount of the judgment 
debt and the costs, if any, incurred since the date of the judgment. The affidavit or 
affirmation must also state the balance owing.  
 
On issuing and serving of the emoluments attachment order to the garnishee, a 
predetermined amount must be stated, this is the amount deducted from the judgment 
debtor’s salary by the garnishee and paid over to the judgment creditor at the end of the 
predetermined period.109 In essence, this process allows the judgment debtor to discharge 
its debt by way of instalments as opposed to a lump sum or instalments as previously 
agreed. As such the initial payment plan is altered- this is the essence of debt review. 
 
Section 65J further provides another procedure for debt review by the court. The court 
can suspend, amend or rescind the order when the judgment debtor shows that after the 
deduction there are insufficient means available to support the judgment debtor and any 
dependants.110 In this regard, the granting of an emoluments attachment order does not 
prohibit any further financial inquiry if the judgment debtor’s circumstances change. 
                                                             
109 S 65J (4). 
110 S 65J (6). 
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This ensures that the purposes of the financial inquiry are achieved as the court ensures 
that the judgment debtor pays off the debt but still has sufficient means to survive. 
However, as Bentley states, there have been various problems with this process, most of 
which go to the heart of effective debt review and have resulted in the Banking 
Association of South Africa’s commitment not to use these orders against credit 
defaulters.111 
 
2.3.5 Section 74. 
 
Section 74 provides for an application for an administration order which acts as a means 
of  debt review for debtors whose debts amount to less than the amount stated by the 
Minister in the Government Gazette, which at present is R50 000.112 This process is 
available to a debtor who has a regular income but is unable to pay the amount of any 
judgment obtained against it in court, or meet its financial obligations. Furthermore, the 
debtor should not have sufficient assets capable of attachment to satisfy such judgment 
obligations. This procedure provides for a rescheduling of a debtor’s debts without 
sequestrating the debtor’s estate hence it is described as a modified form of insolvency 
proceedings.113 
 
In terms of the administration order, the court appoints an administrator to take control 
of the debtor’s financial affairs and to manage the payment of debts due to creditors.114 
After deducting the necessary expenses and its remuneration (which may not be more 
                                                             
111 B Bentley ‘Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders’ 
2013 De Rebus 22. See further: University of Pretoria Law Clinic ‘The incidence of and the undesirable 
practices relating to garnishee orders in South Africa.’, available at 
http://www.ncr.org.za/publications/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-REPORT.pdf, accessed on 20 March 
2014, 25-29. ‘The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders – a follow up 
report.’, available at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%20up%20report.pdf, 
accessed on 15 March 2014, 31-60.  
112 GN R3441 of 31 December 1992. 
113  C Theophilopoulus, A Rowan, CM van Heerden Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 2ed 
(2008) 396. 
114 S 74E(1). 
 28 
than 12.5 per cent of the collected amount), the administrator will make a regular 
distribution in weekly or monthly instalments or otherwise out of the amount received 
from the debtor.115  In addition, the administrator may retain a maximum of 25 per cent 
of the amount collected (capped at R600) which may be used towards unforeseen costs 
that the administrator may incur if the debtor defaults.116 
 
The application for administration must be accompanied by the prescribed statement of 
affairs in which details pertaining to the creditors and amounts owed are stated. All debts 
listed in the statement of affairs are deemed to be proved but are subject to any 
amendments the court may make.117  
 
During the hearing of the application for administration, the court or any creditor or legal 
representative may question the debtor in regard to the assets and liabilities, present and 
future income including the spouse’s income, standard of living and possibilities of 
economising ;and any other relevant matters.118 Thereafter, a weekly or monthly amount 
payable is determined.  
 
This procedure, however, excludes from its ambit debts that become due and payable in 
future for example, mortgage bonds and assets subject to credit agreements. In essence, 
an administration order granted in terms of this section does not take full account of the 
judgment debtor’s circumstances. As a result the benefits that can be derived from it are 
limited as it is probable that in some cases the debtor will not finish paying off its debts 
because the debts excluded from the ambit of the administration order place an 
additional burden on the debtor’s pocket. As a result, effective debt review is not 
achieved. 
 
                                                             
115 S 74L(2). 
116 S 74L(1)(b) MCA read with rule 48(4) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules. 
117 S 74B(1)(b). 
118 Theophilopoulus op cit (n113) 397. 
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Nonetheless, the legislature’s dedication to alleviating over-indebtedness is still evident. 
The administration order affords the judgment debtor some advantage, it is protected 
from legal action.119 Section 65I further states that the administration order must be 
disposed of before the s 65 in camera hearing can proceed; which indicates the 
legislature’s dedication to ensuring the accessibility of debt review.  
 
2.3.6 Concluding remarks on financial inquiries in terms of the MCA. 
 
From the above discussion of financial inquiries in terms of the MCA, one cannot deny 
the legislature’s dedication to alleviating over-indebtedness. Aside from the fact that 
some of the above mentioned procedures fail to take full account of  the debtor’s 
position and are heavily reliant on the court’s time, the procedures, in particular, 
administration orders played a central role in attempting to alleviate over-indebtedness 
prior to the NCA. However, the major shortfall of these provisions is that their ambit 
excluded credit agreements as defined in the NCA which in the light of the statistics 
discussed in Chapter 1 leaves many of the over indebted consumers without legal 
recourse.  
 
One of the major distinguishing factors of the procedures discussed above is that apart 
from the s 74 administration orders, the procedure that results in the financial inquiry 
taking place is normally initiated by the judgment creditor. This results in a power 
imbalance between the parties. Essentially, the judgment debtor is at the mercy of the 
judgment creditor, if it does not initiate proceedings to recover the debt; the financial 
inquiry will not take place. Furthermore, the procedures being heavily reliant on the 
court’s resources and time makes the process unavailable to those who can not afford 
                                                             
119 N Campbell and S Logan The Credit Guide: manage your money with the National Credit Act (2008) 
109. 
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legal services. In addition, they do not foster the objectives of the debt review 120 which 
are only achieved if the process is accessible to the masses that need it.  
 
Boraine states that the complaints regarding the ‘administration industry’, a debt review 
mechanism, can be divided into four distinct categories being the:121 
a. wide range of practical issues pertaining to the application of s 74; 
b. wide range of alleged abuses of s 57, 58 and 74; 
c. consumer-related issues stemming from micro loans, debt collection, blacklisting 
and garnishee orders; 
d. unregulated profession of the administrator. 
 
It is imperative that the weaknesses of the financial inquiries in terms of the MCA are 
rectified by the NCA’s debt review in order for it to play a central role in alleviating 
over-indebtedness. 
 
2.3 SEQUESTRATION. 
  
The Insolvency Act makes provision for compulsory sequestration and voluntary 
surrender in sections 9(1) and 3(1) respectively. In the case where a creditor applies to 
court for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate it amounts to compulsory sequestration. 
Voluntary surrender occurs if the debtor, itself, or its agent applies to court for 
acceptance of the surrender of its estate. Although the requirements of voluntary 
surrender and compulsory sequestration are different, the consequences are the same.122 
                                                             
120 As stated in the NCA. 
121 Boraine op cit (n102) 199. 
122 In order to qualify for voluntary surrender in terms of s 3 a debtor’s estate must in fact be insolvent, 
must own realizable property of sufficient value to defray all costs of the sequestration in terms of the Act 
which are payable out of the residue of the estate and the sequestration must be to the advantage of the 
creditors. For a court to order compulsory sequestration in terms of s 10, the applicant must have a claim 
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In deciding whether sequestration is the right course of action, the court has to determine 
whether it is in the best interests of the debtor’s creditors.123  The available funds for 
distribution will only be known once the estate assets have been sold which presents 
difficulties in the practical application of the best interest criterion.124 Although outdated, 
research results identified that  in 1989 creditors received a dividend in 28.6 per cent of 
the cases and contributed towards the cost of sequastration in 40 per cent  of the cases, 
rendering the efficacy of this procedure questionable.125 If the debtor’s creditors are not 
pressing it for payment and are willing to give it time or to accept monthly instalments, 
the court has the discretion to reject the application.126 Evidently, the granting of such 
application is dependent on the facts of each case. In addition, the court does not grant 
this relief unless the debtor owns sufficient assets that can be sold to pay all costs of the 
sequestration in terms of this Act which means  that in prcatice, one can be too poor to 
be seuqatrated. 
 
In terms of s 3(3) the court before accepting or declining the voluntary surrender, may 
require a petitioner or any other person to appear in court in order to allow for an inquiry 
into the debtor’s financial circumstances allowing  the court to gain an in-depth 
understanding of its estate. Upon the court granting the sequestration order, the 
insolvent’s assets will be sold and all the creditors who submit and prove claims will be 
paid a dividend and the balance of the debt will be written off.127 The creditors who 
make a claim against the debtor’s insolvent estate contribute towards the costs of 
sequestration and only when there is money left over do they share what is left between 
them, however, the debtor receives none of the proceeds.128 Sequestration can result in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that entitles it to apply for the same. In addition, the debtor must have committed an act of insolvency or 
must be insolvent and there must be reason to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of the 
creditors.  
123 S 6(1). 
124 Boraine op cit (n102) 195. 
125  Working Paper 29 Project 63 ‘Review of the law of Insolvency: Prerequisites for alternatives to 
sequestration (1989) Schedule 3.  
126Ex parte Kruger 1928 (CPD) 233. 
127 Campbell op cit (n119) 109. 
128Ibid. 
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large percentage of a consumer’s debt being written off, which is an invaluable benefit to 
the debtor.129 Sequestration as a result allows debt review because the payments to the 
creditors are revised (dividends awarded) followed by debt discharge. 
 
Sequestration has a wider ambit than some of the provisions providing for debt review in 
the MCA and the NCA, as a result it is a more effective means of debt review. Included 
in the insolvent‘s estate is the property at the date of sequestration and any property 
acquired or accruing to it during sequestration.130 As a result of this far-reaching ambit, 
the insolvent estate is vested in the Master until a trustee is appointed, thereby limiting 
the insolvent’s freedom to utilise its assets.131 In addition, sequestration has an effect on 
the property of the insolvent’s spouse. 132  Furthermore, it places conditions on the 
insolvent’s personal and professional contractual capacity. 133  Sequestration places a 
heavy burden on the insolvent because the limitations placed on it and its property, its 
spouse’s estate, and the stigma attached to the process. However, the rehabilitation 
process affords the insolvent a fresh start.134  
 
The key distinction between this debt review process and those provided for by the NCA 
and MCA is that sequestration does not only provide for debt rearrangement but also 
discharge in all cases.135 Its effects makes this procedure suitable for extremely over-
indebted consumers and leaves room for milder forms of review as provided for in the 
MCA and NCA for those not falling within its ambit.  
 
The Insolvency Act provides for two other means of debt review, common law 
compromise and statutory composition. A debtor facing financial difficulty or whose 
                                                             
129Ibid.  
130 S 20(2). 
131 S 20(1) (a). 
132 S 21. 
133 S 23. 
134 S 124. 
135 The NCA debt review provides for discharge only in cases where the court finds that there was reckless 
granting of credit. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
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estate has been provisionally sequestrated (even before this) can still enter into a 
compromise (often referred to as common law compromise) 136  in writing with its 
creditors.137  This process is based on a contract thus it requires approval of all the 
creditors. 138  This process releases the debtor from its debts without going through 
sequestration.139 Statutory compromise is provided for in s 119  of the Insolvency Act. In 
terms of this process which takes place under the supervision of the trustee, and the 
decision of the majority of the creditors binds the dissenting minority. 140  Like 
sequestration, both statutory composition and common-law compromise provide for a 
dividend payment to the creditors and thereafter debt discharge. 
 
2.4 DEBT REVIEW UNDER THE NCA. 
 
The NCA aims to discourage the granting of reckless credit and alleviate over-
indebtedness. 141  It requires the credit provider to evaluate a prospective debtor’s 
creditworthiness before credit is granted.142 In addition, it provides for a court based debt 
review process in terms s 85 and 87, and a predominantly out-of-court based debt review 
process in terms of s 86. The Act provides that the provisions dealing with over-
indebtedness and rescheduling of debt do not apply to juristic persons in their capacity as 
consumers in terms of a credit agreement.143 It is debatable whether this applies to trusts 
as well. Van Heerden submits that in the instances where a trust qualifies as a natural 
person it will be able to access these measures.144 Debt review and debt rearrangement 
apply to all debts including lump sums payable immediately or within a reasonable 
                                                             
136 R Sharrock, R Smith and A Van Der Linde Holckly’s Insolvency Law 9ed (2012) 203. 
137 Mahomed v Lockhat Brothers & Co Ltd 1944 (AD) 230 at 241. 
138 Sharrock, op cit (n136) 203. 
139 Ibid. 
140 S 119. 
141 S 3. 
142 S 81(2)(a). 
143 S 78(1). 
144 Van Heerden op cit (n101) par 11-3. 
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period of demand.145 It is not limited to the consumer’s periodic obligations arising from 
instalment contracts.146 
 
Section 86 makes provision for the consumer to apply for debt review in the prescribed 
manner and form in order to be declared over-indebted. However, the consumer does not 
have the liberty to do so if the credit provider under the credit agreement has already 
proceeded to take steps contemplated in s 129, the procedure required before debt 
enforcement. The National Credit Amendment Act147 s 26 incorporated the view of the 
court in Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Honda Finance v Owens148 which states that a consumer 
may not apply for debt review if the credit provider has taken steps in s 130. The effect 
of which is that s 86 now excludes from its ambit credit agreements subject to debt 
procedures in court (s 130) rather than those that are subject to the procedrures before 
debt enforcement (s 129). This widens the ambit for debt review furthering the aims of 
the NCA.  
 
The debt review procedure consists of two stages, the first is conducted with the 
assistance of the debt counsellor and the other in court. In terms of s 86, the debt 
counsellor may require the consumer to pay an application fee not exceeding the 
prescribed amount (currently R50) before accepting an application. 149  It is further 
prohibited from accepting or requiring a fee from the credit provider in respect of an 
application. On receipt of an application, a debt counsellor must provide the consumer 
with proof of receipt of the application and notify the credit providers listed in the 
                                                             
145  BMW Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Donkin 2009 (6) SA 63 (KZD) para 28. A 
comprehensive list of agreements debt review applies to can be found in regulation 24(cc) (iii) of the 
National Credit Regulation 2006, Government Notice R489. 
146  Otto op cit (n101) 62. 
147 19 of 2014. 
148 2013 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 11. The court in casu approved the views of the court in Changing Tides 
17 (Pty) Ltd v Grobler 2011 ZAGPHC 84. 
149 Campbell op cit (n119) 98.  
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application and every registered credit bureaux. The application fee is not the only fee 
required by the debt counsellor, there are various costs to be paid by the consumer.150 
 
Section 86(6) requires that upon the debt counsellor accepting the application by the 
consumer, it must determine in the prescribed manner and within 30 business days  from 
the date of the application, whether the consumer appears to be over-indebted.151 In a 
case where the consumer seeks a declaration of reckless credit, it must determine 
whether any of the consumer’s credit agreements appear to be reckless.  
 
If the consumer’s application is rejected, the debt counsellor must advise the consumer 
that it may with leave from the Magistrates’ Court, apply directly within 20 business 
days (the period can be extended if good cause shown) for an order to be declared over-
indebted, have an agreement declared reckless and/or have its debt restructured.152 After 
completing the assessment, the debt counsellor must submit form 17.2 to all affected 
credit providers and all registered credit bureaux.153 
 
If the debt counsellor finds that the consumer concerned is over-indebted, the consumer 
is placed under debt counselling, in which case it does not have to deal with its creditors 
directly.154 In this situation, ‘the debt counsellor’s role is that of a neutral, statutory 
                                                             
150 The application fee for debt review is pegged at R50. The National Credit Regulator ‘Fees Guidelines’, 
available at http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Guidelines/2011/Debt_Counselling_Fee_Guidelines.pdf, accessed 
on 2 April 2014, state the following approved fees: 
a. Rejection fee- R300 (excluding VAT (value added tax)) 
b. Restructuring  fee of accepted applications for both single applications and joint applications at  
R6000 (excluding VAT) 
c. Monthly-care fee payable in the 2nd month after the re-structuring fee referred to above is paid. It 
is pegged at 5% up to a maximum of R400 (excluding VAT) for the first 24 months thereafter 3% 
to a maximum of R400 (excluding VAT). 
d. Legal fees for the consent order are R750. The NCR also approved other legal fees, the costs of 
which are subject to the negotiation of the two parties but does not state specifically what the 
costs are. 
151 Regulation 24(6). 
152 Regulation 26(1). The consumer must complete form 18 when making an application to court. 
153 Regulation 24(10). The debt counsellor in terms of regulation 25(6) must issue a statement advising the 
consumer of this. 
154 Campbell op cit (n119) 102. 
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functionary who does not seek to advance any particular party’s cause.’ 155  Upon 
accepting such an application, the debt counsellor must issue a formal rearrangement 
proposal to the creditors on the consumer’s behalf. A debt counsellor may make 
recommendations to the Magistrates’ Court in terms of s 86(7) as listed above.156 In 
addition, it may also recalculate the consumer’s obligation because of contravention of 
Part A or  B of Chapter 5, or Part A of Chapter 6.157 Upon making this finding, the debt 
counsellor must refer the application to the Magistrates’ Court. 158  It is during this 
process that, a credit provider has a right to terminate debt review regardless of whether 
the matter has been referred to the Magistrates’ Court or not. The outcome of the debt 
review process is eventually in the hands of the Magistrates’ Court if the proposal is not 
consented to by all the credit providers and the consumer.159  
 
Section 86 does not only deal with situations where the consumer is already over-
indebted, the debt counsellor can request the respective credit providers to voluntarily 
consider and agree on a plan of debt rearrangement if the consumer is not over-indebted 
but is likely to become over-indebted.160 
 
Section 85 allows the court to declare a consumer to be over-indebted and provides relief 
despite any law or agreement to the contrary. The debt review process in this case is 
streamlined as the court need not wait for the recommendations of the debt counsellor to 
make a formal rearrangement of the consumer’s debt.161 The court may refer the matter 
directly to a debt counsellor if it is alleged that the consumer under a credit agreement is 
over-indebted.162 In terms of this section, reference ‘to the court’ entails that this process 
is not limited to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ Court alone but also the High 
                                                             
155 M Kelly-Louw and PN Stoop Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 339. 
156 Chapter 2.1 herein. 
157 Unlawful agreements and provision and disclosure, form and effect of credit agreements are dealt with 
Part A and B of Chapter 5 respectively. Part A of Chapter 6 contains collection and repayment practices. 
158 S 86(8)(b). 
159 Kelly-Louw op cit (n155) 338. 
160 S 86(7)(b). 
161 S 85(b). 
162 S 85(a) and 86(11). 
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Court. 163  Where the High court refers the matter to a debt counsellor, the 
recommendation would be made to the High Court.164  
 
A consumer has access to debt review in three ways: referral by the court in terms of s 
85, voluntarily in terms of s 86(1), and referral by a credit provider in terms of s 129. 
Although, the court plays a vital role, most of  the work ought to be done by the debt 
counsellor. Essentially, if the process works as envisioned, the court ought to simply 
review the proposal agreed to by both parties before making it an order of court if it 
agrees with the application. To this extent, the court’s role ought to be minimal but does 
not imply that the court need not apply its mind to the case at hand. Furthermore, the 
debt review process is available at various stages to the consumer which increases its 
availability to over-indebted consumers.165 In addition, the recommendations which the 
debt counsellor can make aim to foster the satisfaction of the debt by the consumer, this 
is in line with the aims of the NCA. 
 
Section 86 makes it clear that debt review is under the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ 
Court. However, procedural clarity of this provision was addressed by the High Court 
(the findings of which were confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nedbank Ltd 
v National Credit Regulator 166). The  High Court167 held as follows: 
a. The magistrate fulfils a judicial role in discharging his duties in terms of s 87 
of the NCA.168 
b. A debt counsellor who refers an application to court under s 86(8) (b) and 
86(7) (c) is not a litigant but fulfilling a statutory obligation.169 
                                                             
163 Standard Bank v Payayiotts 2009 (6) SA 295 (W) para 17. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Voluntarily in terms of s 86, prior to debt enforcement in terms of s 129 and by referral of the court s 
85. 
166 2011 (3) SA 581 (SCA). 
167 2009 (6) SA 295 (GNP). 
168 National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 306. 
169 National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 312. 
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c. The Magistrates’ Court Act and the Magistrates’ Court Rules170 govern the 
procedure by which the Magistrates’ Court may conduct itself in conducting 
a hearing171 and making appropriate orders in terms of the NCA.172 However, 
the court in Standard Bank v Panayiotts held that the High Court would be 
able to attend to such debt restructuring.173 
d. A referral by the debt counsellor as provided in s 86(7)(c) and 86(8)(b) of the 
NCA to the Magistrates’ Court is an application within the meaning of the 
Magistrates’ Court Act and Rules.174 
e. Service of any documents as contemplated in s 86(7) (c), 86(8)(b) and 87 of 
the NCA will be treated in accordance with rule 9 of the Magistrates’ Court 
Rules, in the absence of an agreement by the affected parties.175 The affected 
parties can agree that service will be by way of email or fax. The Jurisdiction 
of Regional Court Amendment Act176 rule 9(3) (f) requires that a referral in 
terms of s 86(7) (c) or 86(8) (b) of the NCA may cause the referral to be 
served by registered post or by hand. The referral in casu occurs upon service 
and not upon the issue of the Rule 55 application.177 
f. A debt counsellor has a duty to assist, should be available and able to render 
such assistance by furnishing evidence, making submissions regarding its 
proposal or  by answering queries raised by the court if it makes a referral to 
Magistrates’ Court in terms of s 86(7) (c) and 86(8)(b) of the NCA.178 
g. For the purposes of s 86(7) (c), 86(8) (b) and 87 of the NCA, the Magistrates’ 
Court having jurisdiction in respect of the person of the consumer is the 
appropriate forum.179  
                                                             
170 GG 33487, Notice R740. 
171 S 87 of the NCA. 
172 S 86 read with section 87 NCA. National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 321. 
173 (2009) ZAGPHC 22 para 17.  
174 Standard Bank v Panayiotts  para 17. The court stated that rule 55 applies.  
175 National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 313. 
176 31 of 2008. 
177  SA Taxi Securitisation v Matlala (2010) ZAGPJHC 70 para. 15. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed this in the  Nedbank Ltd  supra (n166) at 25- 28. 
178 National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 314. 
179 Ibid.  
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h. In regard to referral in terms of s 87, there is no monetary limit on the 
jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Court.180 
 
Although, many of the uncertainties have been dealt with the High Court in the above 
case, the legislature must deal with these issues as they relate to locus standi, jurisdiction 
and the manner of service.181 In light of this decision and various other cases that have 
been decided and have provided procedural clarity on the debt review process, there 
ought to be a decrease in the number of over-indebted consumers in South Africa so as 
to evidence the fact that the debt review procedure is working effectively, serving its 
purpose and achieving the aims of the NCA. However, in light of the statistics elicited in 
Chapter 1, it is evident that this is not the case. The question that follows relates to what 
the problems are and is it really an improvement on the previous means of debt review. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Debt review in terms of the NCA is more simplified and is accessible at various stages 
of the dispute resolution process. Debt review is more accessible to over-indebted 
consumers, its availability is not limited to before or after court proceedings or through a 
debt counsellor alone. In addition, as a result of the wide definition of a credit agreement 
as contained in s 8 of the NCA, the debt review procedure has wide ambit of application.  
It provides a means by which a consumer who does not meet the stringent requirements 
of insolvency and is not yet facing serious financial difficulties as in the case of 
insolvency proceedings can obtain debt rearrangement and discharge if the agreement is 
found to be reckless. In this regard as with s 74 administration orders, s86 debt review 
acts as a modified form of insolvency.  
                                                             
180 National Credit Regulator supra (n167) page 315. 
181 A Boraine, C van Heerden and M Roestoff  “A comparison between formal administration orders and 
debt review- the pros and cons of these measures and suggestions of law reform (Part 2)” (2012) De Jure 
254 at 270. The Debt Counselling Regulation 2012 Government Notice 3362 has done so to an extent- 
Regulation 4 dealing with the application of rule 55 of the Magistrates’ Court Rules and Regulation 3 
dealing with delivery, compliance and implementation of the court order time period. 
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Is the debt review in terms of the NCA an improvement from the MCA debt review? 
 
The NCA has reformed the credit industry in various ways, including addressing the 
procedures relating to debt collection, blacklisting, in addition to attempting to rectify 
the micro-lender’s bad practices. It further rectifies the power imbalance implicit in the 
provisions of the MCA by affording the consumer the right to initiate debt review.182  
Debt review in terms of the NCA has rectified the issues that arose in regards to the 
administration profession. The NCA regulates the debt counselling profession and 
regulates the receipt of funds from consumers in that capacity, a key flaw of the s 74 
administration orders.183 Boraine states that unregulation profession of the administrator 
is probably the reason for many of the difficulties experienced with the procedure.184 In 
accordance with this view, since the debt counsellors and payment distribution agencies 
are regulated, the practical difficulties experienced in respect to administration order 
under the MCA would be minimised under the NCA debt review. Whether these 
practical difficulties have been resolved is out of the scope of this research. However, in 
agreement with other researchers’ views new problems have arisen185- one of which is 
the subject matter of this research.  
 
In terms of the MCA, s 74 administration orders played a key role in providing for debt 
review prior to the NCA, however, its jurisdictional limit of R50, 000 leaves a large 
percentage of the population with very little recourse. Prior to the NCA, in a case where 
the consumer fell into the category that was outside the MCA’s ambit and did not meet 
the stringent requirement of the sequestration, it was left with very little recourse. As 
such debt review in terms of the NCA has filled this void to the extent that it applies to 
credit agreements. 
                                                             
182 As did the Insolvency Act in providing for both voluntary and compulsory sequestration. 
183 S 44 and of 46 of the NCA. Regulation 491) (ii), 10 and 11 of the National Credit Regulation. 
184 Boraine op cit (n102) 199.  
185  Roestoff M, Haupt F, Coetzee H and Erasmus M, “The debt counselling process- closing the loopholes 
in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2009) PER 12 247/360. 
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In attempt to ensure that debt review was available to the over-indebted masses, the debt 
review application fee was set at R50. Whether this procedure is cost effective in 
comparison to the  MCA debt review is questionable as the cumulative costs of the NCA 
debt review procedure are high.186 
 
Is the NCA debt review an answer to the shortfalls of the Insolvency Act debt Review 
methods? 
 
The South African Law Reform recognised that there was a serious need for a debt 
review mechanism that would be available to more over-indebted consumers, as a result 
the Draft Insolvency Bill187 suggested that insertion of s 74X in the MCA. The section 
would provide for a pre-liquidation composition procedure amongst the debtor and credit 
providers which would be binding if accepted by the majority of the creditors (in number 
and two-thirds in value) of the concurrent creditors who voted for composition. This was 
meant to resolve the fact that the insolvency procedures were out of reach for many 
debtors as result of their requirements.    
 
Boraine highlights four shortfalls of this provision which act as a barrier to adequate 
debt review.188 Firstly, the Bill did not state how it would relate to administration orders. 
Was it meant to replace s 74 administration orders? Secondly, was the process meant to 
service all debtors? Boraine states that it would be available to those who do not qualify 
for administration or sequestration.189 Thirdly, the provision did not address situations 
where pre-liquidation composition did not meet the majority threshold- what relief 
                                                             
186 See footnote 153 herein.  Based on the current fees as contained in the National Credit Regulator Fees 
Guidelines, a consumer who is under debt review for a period of 18 months must pay R 10,250 to the debt 
counselor excluding VAT and any legal fees accumulated. The consumer must owe at least R8000 in order 
for the debt counselor to charge a maximum of R400 in the first 24 months. 
187 2000. 
188 Boraine op cit (n102) 197. 
189 Ibid. 
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would such debtors have?190 Fourthly, this process will be heavily dependent on the 
court’s time which is not ideal considering that the courts are over-burdened. 191 
Evidently s 74X would not have been an adequate remedy to this problem.   
 
The NCA provides an alternative means of debt review for consumers who do not meet 
the requirements of the Insolvency Act. In addition, it provides for a milder form of debt 
review which has more consumer friendly effects on its status and estate. Furthermore, it 
promotes the satisfaction of all debts and only provides for debt discharge in cases where 
there was reckless granting of credit. Whether the NCA debt review on its own addresses 
the main concern that resulted in the Draft Insolvency Bill is debatable.                                                                                                              
 
The state of debt review in South Africa. 
 
As discussed, despite their shortfalls, there are various options available for an indebted 
consumer. However, as a result of these various options, various issues arise. Firstly, 
how do the various provisions interact- will debt review in terms of the NCA be 
sufficient in order to alleviate over-indebtedness in the absence of the various procedures 
provided for in the MCA especially s 74 administration orders? The South African Law 
Reform Commission is of the view that debt review in terms of the NCA ,on its own, can 
assist debtors who find themselves in financial distress provided that three issues are 
resolved.192 Firstly, a provision affording persons who become over-indebted as a result 
of delictual claims should be introduced in order to afford such persons the protection 
afforded by the NCA. 193  Secondly, a provision addressing non-compliance with 
rescheduled obligations must be considered.194  Thirdly, a sunset clause allowing persons 
                                                             
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 South African Law Reform Commission ‘Review of administration orders (project 127): Questionnaire 
on abolition of administration orders’, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/media/2008%2003%2007%20Media%20statement%20Questionnaire%20
Administration%20Orders.pdf, accessed  on 28 March 2014. 
193 South African Law Reform Commission op cit (n192) 2. 
194 South African Law Reform Commission op cit (n192) 3.  
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under administration orders should also be considered.195 Furthermore, a provision that 
allows for administration orders to lapse upon, the expiry of a specified period after the 
granting thereof or the coming into operation of amendments to provide for discharge, 
whichever occurs later.196 It is submitted that in light of the fundamental differences and 
challenges discussed above of the various debt review mechanisms, none can exist in 
isolation. All the debt review mechanisms have different requirements, and are available 
at different stages of the consumer’s debt trap.197 
 
Secondly, what is the maximum time limit for debt rearrangement or rescheduling? 
Unlike the debt review procedures under the Insolvency Act198, the NCA and MCA 
provisions do not place a time limit for the debt rearrangement. As a result, a consumer 
can be subject to debt review for an unlimited amount of time. However, unlike the 
MCA, the NCA debt review procedures are subject to the principle of satisfaction by the 
consumer of all financial obligations.199 In addition, the NCA places priority on the 
eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations under credit agreement.200 
Boraine is of the view that debt review should be developed in accordance with 
international standards and that there should be a maximum of ten years on the 
process.201 
 
Thirdly, where all the debt review procedures envisioned to be court-based processes? 
The debt review procedures provided for by the MCA and Insolvency Act are heavily 
dependent on the court’s time and resources. At the time of enactment of the  NCA, 
                                                             
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 When the consumer experiences difficulties in making payments before the agreement is enforced (debt 
review in terms of the NCA), after the agreement has been enforced (debt review in terms of the MCA or 
section 85 of the NCA) and when it is insolvent but has assets that can be realised in order to make a 
distribution to the creditors (sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act). 
198  Once an insolvent estate is liquidated and the dividend has been paid out, he or she enters into 
rehabilitation. 
199 S 3(g) of the NCA. 
200  S 3(i). The use of the word “eventual” does not encourage the satisfaction of debts, as it does not 
convey the need to make urgent payments. 
201 Boraine op cit (n102) 203. National Credit Act Regulation and Notices Government Notice 1209 in 
schedule 2 regulation 17 deals with the time period for which the credit bureau can retain information and 
not period of debt re-structure. 
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there was a need for a predominately out of court debt review procedure. It is submitted 
that in light of the wording of s 86, the legislature intended on rectifying this problem.202 
Whether this procedure, in practice, is a predominantly out of court based is debatable.   
 
Although there is vast improvement, there is still room for a debt review mechanism that 
better serves the South African population.203  Debt review creates an administrative 
burden for creditors and is a rather expensive exercise for everyone involved including 
the state. However, it is a mechanism worth having in a credit market such as South 
Africa’s.  As stated above debt review is not new in South African law, but a provision 
allowing for unilateral termination of the debt review process (s 86(10)) is a new 
concept. The MCA and Insolvency Act provisions allowing for financial inquiries do not 
contain similar provisions to s 86(10). This begs the question as to what the purpose, 
value and aim of s 86(10) in the debt review process is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
202 The debt counsellor does majority of the work, it provides recommendations of debt rearrangement and 
the analysis of whether the credit agreement was granted recklessly. 
203 See A Boraine op cit (n181) 270-271 for improvements on the debt review process.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, the current law will be discussed with particular focus on Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s judgment in the Collet case. The judgment is analysed in the context of the 
consumer’s right of access to court, the debt review process and the obstacles 
encountered in it. Furthermore, discussion of the meaning of good faith in South African 
law will be engaged in to determine whether the good faith obligation as it is currently 
provided for is enforceable. A discussion about whether the amendment of s 86(10) 
addresses the shortfalls highlighted will follow. 
 
3.1.1 Collet v Firstrand Bank & National Credit Regulator (2011) (4) SA 508 (SCA). 
 
This case was an appeal against the judgment of Eksteen J in the Eastern Cape High 
Court, in which he granted a summary judgment against the appellant and an order 
declaring certain immovable property executable.204 The appellant was in default with 
her repayments under a mortgage bond, and her failure to pay any or all of the agreed 
installments resulted in the whole of the outstanding amount becoming due and payable. 
The appellant successfully applied for debt review in terms of s 86(1) on 4 January 2010, 
resulting in the debt obligations being in the process of restructure on 15 February 
2010.205 Upon refusal of the debt restructuring proposal by credit providers, the debt 
counsellor referred the matter on 29 March 2010 to the East London Magistrates’ Court 
in terms of s 86(8) of the NCA in order for the appellant to be declared over-indebted or 
that her debt commitments be rearranged.206  
 
                                                             
204 Collet supra (n3) at 1. 
205 Collet supra (n3) at 2. 
206 Ibid. 
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On 7 April 2010, more than 60 days pursuant to the applicant’s application and the 
referral to the Magistrates’ Court, the respondent terminated the debt review in respect 
of the mortgage bond in terms of s 86(10).207 The hearing before the court in terms of s 
87 was set down for 10 June 2010 and later postponed to 12 August 2010.208 Summons 
were issued on 21 June 2010 and served on the appellant on 1 July 2010.209  
 
The issue before the court was ‘whether a credit provider is entitled to terminate debt 
review in terms of section 86(10) after the debt counsellor has referred the matter to the 
Magistrates’ Court for an order envisaged by sections 86(7)(c) and 87(1)(b) and while 
the hearing in terms of section 87 is still pending.’210 Essentially, the court had to decide 
when ‘the entitlement to terminate the debt review arises and ends, as well as the 
meaning of section 86(11)’.211 
 
In deciding this issue, the court discussed the jurisprudence concerning the matter 
focusing on Griesel J’s judgment of the Wesbank a division of First Rand Bank Ltd v 
Papier (with the NCR as Amicus Curiae).212 Malan JA was of the view that Griesel J 
correctly followed the contextual approach and that consideration of the section 
appearing in Part D of Chapter 4 of the Act which contain debt review and debt 
rearrangement was appropriate.213 Griesel J further stated that the ‘debt counsellor has 
30 days within which he ought to determine whether the consumer is over-indebted’.214 
In a case where ‘the debt counsellor concludes that the consumer is not over-indebted, he 
must advise the consumer of his right to approach the court within a further 20 business 
days for the necessary order’.215 In addition, neither the NCA nor the regulations contain 
a period for referral to the court, however, having regard to the context, the consumer or 
                                                             
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Collet supra (n3) at 6. 
211 Ibid. 
212 2011 (2) SA 365 (WCC). 
213 Collet supra (n3) at 7. 
214 Collet supra (n3) at 8. 
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 47 
the debt counsellor had a further ten business days in which to approach the court which 
was insufficient.216  
  
Regardless of the correctness of the above approach, Malan JA was of the view that it 
was limited and stated that 
‘A sounder approach is to recognise the express words of section 86(10) which gives the credit 
provider a right to terminate the debt review in respect of the particular credit transaction under 
which the consumer is in default, and only when he is default, at least 60 business days after the 
application for debt review was made.’217  
 
Malan JA further stated that in contrast to Griesel J’s finding, the right to terminate the 
debt review process should not be viewed as ‘derailing’ the process because it is the 
consumer that it is in breach of contract not the credit provider, as this right does not 
exist in the case when the consumer is not in default. 218  Furthermore, the right to 
terminate was not limited to the process prior to the reference to the Magistrates’ Court 
and continues until an order envisaged in s 87 has been made.219 
 
Malan JA states that the right contained in s 86(10) is balanced by s 86(11) that allows 
for resumption of debt review by an order of the Magistrates’ Court on any condition 
that the court considers to be just in the circumstances.220 Malan JA went further to state 
that it is at this moment that the participation of the credit provider in debt review 
becomes relevant: he is obliged to comply with reasonable requests of the debt 
counsellor and participate in good faith in the review and any negotiations in terms of s 
86(5)(a) and 85(5)(b).221 
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Malan JA held that the words ‘hearing the matter’ in s 86(11) relate to the proceedings to 
enforce the agreement which could either be in, the High or the Magistrates’ Court that 
warranted a reading of the words ‘or High Court’ into the section.222  The learned Judge 
stated that over-indebtedness is not a defence against summary judgment and the 
purpose of such a judgment was to prevent sham defences.223  However, although the 
factors do not constitute a defence to the claim, a defendant may request a court hearing 
a summary judgment application to consider a credit provider’s failure to participate or 
its bad faith in participating when deciding an application for summary judgment.224 The 
appellant in casu did not make such a request before the court a quo and did not place 
sufficient information before it in order to determine whether to order resumption.225  
 
Malan JA did not approve the proposal made by the debt counsellor. It ‘envisaged a debt 
restructuring in terms of which the monthly installments payable on the mortgage bond 
would be reduced from R 6 644,93 to R3 500,00, but payable over the same period of 
time, that is 240 months, thereby depriving the credit provider of nearly half the value of 
the credit agreement. 226  Malan JA considered this when dismissing the appeal and 
holding that the termination of debt review was justified.227 Malan JA further stated that 
such proposal was not in line with the NCA, in particular s 86(7)(c)(ii) which places 
limits on the proposal for the rearrangement as well as on the order to be made in terms 
of s 87(1).228 The learned Judge dismissed the appeal without an order of costs as none 
was sought.229 
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3.1.2 Analysis of the Collet judgment. 
 
Although there is a need for debt review mechanisms in South Africa, the right balance 
ought to be struck, recognising that consumer credit is usually based on contract and as 
such, the debt relief measures should not ignore the underlying basis of the law of 
contract, namely pacta sunt servanda.230   
 
It is submitted that Malan JA’s judgment has various shortfalls that will be discussed in 
the course of this chapter. Although Malan JA, in interpreting the meaning of the 
provision, considered its express words and its context of operation, he ought to have 
taken other considerations in addition to s 86(5) and (11) into account. He ought to have 
considered the law on good faith and the socio-economic factors affecting the 
provision’s operation. Although the learned Judge considered the purpose of debt 
review, he did not discuss the purpose of the particular provision and how it fosters the 
achievement of the purposes of the debt review process. The debt review process’ 
impact on the credit provider’s rights must be considered, however, sight must not be 
lost of the aims of the NCA and how they aim to empower and provide recourse for the 
consumer. It is acknowledged that the learned Judge could only discuss the issues 
presented before the court; however, the shortfalls outlined below indicate that there is a 
need to revisit this decision.  
 
In interpreting s 86(10) the process set out by Wallis JA (with Farlam, Van Heerden, 
Cachalia and Leach JA concurring) in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund231 will be 
applied, and provides as follows:  
‘[18] Over the last century there have been significant developments in the law relating to the 
interpretation of documents, both in this country and in others that follow similar rules to our own.
 
It is unnecessary to add unduly to the burden of annotations by trawling through the case law on the 
construction of documents in order to trace those developments. The relevant authorities are 
collected and summarised in Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman 
Primary School.
 
The present state of the law can be expressed as follows. Interpretation is the 
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process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other 
statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the particular 
provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant 
upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given 
to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which 
the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be 
weighed in the light of all these factors.
 
The process is objective not subjective. A sensible meaning 
is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the 
apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to 
substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To 
do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and 
legislation. In a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in 
fact made. The ‘inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself’,
 
read in context 
and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and 
production of the document.’232 [My emphasis] 
 
Wallis JA in the Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund case stated that this process must 
only be employed when attributing meaning to words that is, where there is a possibility 
of various meanings. This begs the question whether s 86(10) give rise to various 
meanings. If this question is answered in the affirmative, echoing the words of the 
learned judge ‘a sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or 
unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document’. The courts 
have been divided on this issue and have given rise to two schools of thought 
culminating in the decision of the Collet. The starting point to determine the sensible 
meaning is the language of the provision as discussed below. 
 
3.1.2.1 The language in section 86(10). 
 
Malan JA in interpreting the provision employed the express words of the section, 
stating that approach was the sounder one.233The right contained in s 86(10) is only 
available when the conditions contained therein are satisfied, which are as follows: 
a. The consumer must be in default under the credit agreement; 
b. The credit agreement must be under review in terms of the s 86; 
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c.  A period of at least 60 days should have lapsed.  
 
The use of the word ‘may’ in s 86(10) suggests that credit provider has a voluntary right 
of termination. Upon the credit provider electing to exercise the voluntary right, the 
provision becomes prescriptive and states that the credit provider must notify the 
consumer, credit bureau and debt counsellor of the termination. 
The use of the phrase ‘being reviewed in section’ as employed in this provision is 
problematic and has been the subject of many debates. It gives rise to the question as to 
what stages debt review comprises of. Whether it includes or excludes the referral of the 
debt rearrangement proposal to the court. From a plain reading of the express words of s 
86 it provides for three stages, which constitutes an application for debt review, the first 
stage being an application in terms of s 86 which takes place between the consumer and 
debt counsellor. The second stage is the debt rearrangement proposal amongst the 
consumer, debt counsellor, and ideally the credit provider(s). The third stage is the 
referral to the court, which requires participation of the consumer, debt counsellor and 
the credit provider(s). The ambiguity in this case stems from the fact that s 86 provides 
for all the above but is however, titled ‘application for debt review’. As such, it is not 
clear which stage of the process set out in s 86; s 86(10) applies. Thus, a reading of the 
section leaves room for various interpretations. 
 
Concerning the debt rearrangement by the debt counsellor, s 86(10) provides that it is a 
proposal, which upon acceptance by the court becomes an order. Therefore, there is a 
need to distinguish between, a proposal referred to court and which is still part of the 
application; and a proposal that has been accepted by court. 234  When a proposal is 
referred to court, the matter is being considered in terms of s 86(8)(b) as such it forms 
part of s 86 thus in the ambit of ‘being reviewed in terms of s 86’ whereas when a court 
considers it, it does so in terms of s 87. As such it is submitted that the conclusion 
reached by Malan JA in Collet is accurate in this regard. 
                                                             
234 As defined in s 86: application by consumer to the debt counselor, the debt restructuring proposal and 
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3.1.2.2 Context and environment of section 86(10). 
 
Wallis AJ further stated that in order to determine the sensible or businesslike 
interpretation of a section, a consideration of its context or environment of operation 
must be employed. 
 
Malan JA based his conclusion of the correct interpretation of s 86(10) in light of the 
express words and the provisions it operates in conjunction with, namely, s 86(5) and 
(11). The learned judge discussed the purpose of debt review and stated that the ‘duty to 
negotiate does not terminate when the debt counsellor refers his proposal to the 
Magistrates’ Court but continues pending the hearing’.235 In addition, the purpose of 
these negotiations is to result in responsible debt rearrangement.236 Malan JA further 
stated that the exercise of the s 86 (10) right does not terminate the hearing in terms of s 
87 in respect of all the credit agreements, but only in respect of the one applicable to the 
credit provider that exercised its right in terms of the section.237 Furthermore, the s 
86(10) right is balanced by s 86(11) which provides that if the credit provider has given 
notice to terminate and proceeds to enforce the agreement, the Magistrates’ Court may 
order that debt review resume on any conditions that it considers to be just in the 
circumstances. According to Malan JA this is the moment at which the participation of 
the credit provider becomes relevant. There is an obligation to comply with the 
reasonable requests of the debt counsellor in terms of s 85(5)(a) and to participate in 
good faith in the review and any negotiations designed to result in responsible debt 
rearrangement (s 85(5)(b)).238 The court stated that a failure or refusal by the credit 
provider to participate in the review might result in the court ordering a resumption of 
                                                             
235 Collet supra (n3) at 13. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Collet supra (n3) at 14. 
238 Collet supra (n3) at 15. 
 53 
the process. The court considered the submission of a financially unsound proposal239 
when considering its resumption.240 
 
Malan JA considered the purpose of the NCA as contained in s 3(c)(i) being the 
promotion of responsibility in the credit market by encouraging responsible borrowing, 
avoidance of over-indebtedness and fulfillment of financial obligations by consumers.241 
The judge also considered that the NCA’s approach to indebtedness ‘is based on the 
principle of satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations by providing for a 
consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring’ thereby prioritising the eventual 
satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations.242  
 
Considering the aims highlighted by Malan JA, a discussion of how the debt review 
process, in particular s 86(10) fosters these aims is necessary. The aim of s 3(c)(i) ought 
to be achieved through the enforcement of the assessment criteria as set out in s 88. It 
should be further achieved through the enforcement of credit agreements, and the debt 
review process and its effects. Although, debt review fosters achievement of this aim, it 
is questionable how s 86(10) contributes towards this.  
 
In practice, the process can be costly. In order for the debt rearrangement proposal to be 
made an order of court, the consumer employs legal services. In the event that the credit 
provider employs its s 86(10) right and attempts to enforce the agreement, the consumer 
must employ further legal services when arguing that the resumption of the debt review 
process should be ordered in terms of s 86(11). This is bound to have a negative impact 
on the consumer’s financial position. The same can be said about the provision 
contributing towards the Act’s aim to foster satisfaction of all responsible consumer 
obligations. In the event that a consumer cannot employ legal services and cannot 
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240 Collet supra (n3) at 15. 
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242 Ibid. S 3(g) and 3(i) of NCA. 
 54 
articulate its case in terms of the NCA, the Magistrates’ Court will have to determine the 
case based on the facts and issues argued before it, possibly depriving the consumer of 
the benefits of the Act’s application. Furthermore, it is illogical that a court should 
entertain such an application when the consumer can afford legal services; because in 
such a case it is probable that it is not over-indebted. 
 
In addition, it is yet to be seen how this provision assists in the creation of a consistent 
and harmonised system of debt restructuring. The effect of the Collet judgment is that it 
creates two systems of debt restructuring: one that is employed in the case where a 
consumer is in default and the other where it is not in default but likely to experience 
financial strain. Although there is still a possibility for debt restructuring, the provision 
frustrates the creation of a consistent and harmonised system. It is submitted that based 
on Part D, in particular s 86 of the Act, it was not the intention of the legislature. The 
effect of the provision is that it frustrates the achievement of this aim.  
 
Considering the overburdened court roll and the income inequality in South Africa, it 
cannot be said that the legislature intended that a consumer in default or experiencing 
financial strain must employ the long process demanded by the court in order to reap the 
benefits of the debt review process in light of the interpretation by Malan JA in Collet.243 
Furthermore, at present the application fee for debt review is R50, which indicates that 
the legislature sought to make this process cheap, efficient and accessible.  The 
commercialisation of the debt counselling process has resulted in the process by which 
most debt counsellors seek to make a profit, thus it is no longer the cheap process the 
legislature envisioned. Considering the fact that the process was intended to be readily 
accessible to consumers, it cannot be said that the extensive participation of the court 
and the need of legal services encourages this. From the number of postponements that 
took place in this case, it is evident that the Magistrates’ Court should not be relied upon 
to resolve debt review matters. With the current stringent time limits and the already 
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over-burdened Magistrates’ Court roll, reliance on it will render the process in most 
cases expensive and unattainable. In December 2008, just over 42 000 consumers 
applied for debt review in terms of s 86 of the NCA, but less than 1600 cases proceeded 
through our courts.244 Although these statistics reflect the position seven years ago, it 
evidences the fact that the backlog facing our judicial system frustrates the aims of the 
Act.  
 
The NCA aims to maintain a delicate balance of the parties’ rights and sets out to 
rehabilitate the over-indebted consumer and promote the eventual satisfaction of the 
debt. However, the approach taken by Malan JA seems to place emphasis on punishing 
the consumer for being in default. 
 
3.1.2.3 Sections in the NCA. 
 
It is submitted that when considering the context in which s 86(10) operates cognisance 
must be had of the fact that the provision appears in Chapter 5 headed ‘Consumer Credit 
Policy’, in particular, Part D of the NCA that addresses over-indebtedness and reckless 
credit. Section 78 deals with the application and interpretation of Part D. Section 79 
defines over-indebtedness and states how to determine it. It provides insight into what 
the legislature aimed to achieve with Part D of the Act, which includes s 86. It provides 
as follows: 
‘79. (1) a consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of available information at the time a 
determination is made indicates that the particular consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a 
timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a 
party, having regard to that consumer’s - 
(a) Financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
(b) Probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the   credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer’s history of debt 
repayment. 
(2) When a determination is to be made whether a consumer is over-indebted or not, the person 
making that determination must apply the criteria set out in subsection (1) as they exist at the 
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time the determination is being made. 
(3) When making a determination in terms of this section, the value of - 
a) Any credit facility is the settlement value at that time under that credit facility; and 
(b) Any credit guarantee is- 
(i) The settlement value of the credit agreement that it guarantees, if the guarantor has 
been called upon to honour that guarantee; or 
(ii) The settlement value of the credit agreement that it guarantees, guarantor has been 
called upon to honour that guarantee; or discounted by a prescribed factor.’ 
 
Section 80 defines ‘reckless credit’ while s 81 and 82 deals with its prevention and 
assessment mechanism and procedures. Sections 83 to 85 address the court’s powers in 
relation to reckless credit agreements. Section 87 deals with the Magistrates’ Court 
powers to rearrange the consumer’s obligation. Section 88 deals with the effect of debt 
rearrangement order or agreement. 
 
 Section 86(10) also works in conjunction with s 86(5) in that it places an obligation on 
the parties in a debt review process to participate in good faith and comply with the 
reasonable requests of the debt counselor in order to facilitate the evaluation of the 
consumer’s state of indebtedness. In addition, the section works alongside s 86(11). The 
section states that if the credit provider has given notice to terminate a review as 
contemplated in s 86(10) and it proceeds to enforce that agreement in terms of Part C of 
Chapter 6, the Magistrates’ Court hearing the matter may order the resumption of the 
debt review on any conditions it considers to be just. An in-depth analysis of what the 
good faith requirement entails will establish that the ground that Malan JA considered in 
his interpretation of s 86(10) and identified as a possible condition on which the court 
will order resumption is currently unenforceable. 
 
Before the referral of a debt rearrangement proposal by a debt counselor to court the debt 
counselor should have concluded that consumer is over indebted. According to s 79, a 
consumer is over-indebted when it is or will be unable to satisfy its obligations. This 
means that consumer should be either in default or having trouble before the 
mechanisms in Part D are invoked. Essentially this means that Part D is meant to cater to 
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consumers in default or those who are likely to experience some strain. The 
interpretation of s 86(10) in Collet shifts the focus of the debt review process from those 
who are unable to satisfy their obligations (in default) to those who are likely to have 
trouble (not in default). Section 86(10) right does not deny consumers in default the 
opportunity to employ the debt review process, however, it acts as a restriction 
especially in light of s 86(11). 
 
3.1.2.4 Far-reaching impact of the NCA.  
 
In Ex Parte Ford245, the court illustrated that the NCA does not only apply in cases 
where the parties to a dispute invoke the Act. The court may require parties to look into 
the possible application of the mechanisms contained therein to resolve the issues. In 
refusing to grant an order for voluntary sequestration, the court took into consideration 
the possibility of recourse to the NCA as a matter of policy.246 Although the drafters of 
the NCA did not make provision for its parallel application alongside the Insolvency 
Act, the court’s role in light of this judgment is to determine what is best for society or 
the parties to a dispute. ‘Public policy gives preference to rights of responsible credit 
grantors over reckless credit grantors and enjoins full satisfaction, as far as it might be 
possible, by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations.’247  This approach 
emphasises the need for a credit provider to thoroughly assess whether or not the 
consumer can afford the credit and correctly identifies the invaluable service that debt 
review provides to society. It reiterates debt review’s role as a means by which the 
legislature sought to alleviate over-indebtedness. As a result, it is essential that it operate 
effectively and efficiently. 
  
3.1.2.5 Purpose of the provision and the background to its production. 
 
                                                             
245 2009 (3) SA 376 (WCC). 
246 Ex Parte Ford supra (n245) at 22. 
247 Ex Parte Ford supra (n245) at 20. 
 58 
The Department of Trade and Industry Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy 
Framework refers to the NCA among other legislation as consumer protection, 
accordingly, the NCA is considered in this light.248 The process of debt review was 
enacted in recognition of the fact that enforcement mechanisms are the integral part of 
consumer protection and that the ability of a consumer to obtain redress requires a 
coherent, adequately resourced and easily accessible infrastructure.249  It was further 
stated that at the time ‘redress for consumers was largely obtainable through the criminal 
and civil justice system as most laws empowered Magistrates’ Courts to deal with 
consumer issues and that the challenges facing government was that litigation of 
consumer abuses competed with serious and violent crimes as a result consumer abuses 
receive less attention’.250 It further highlighted, among other factors, that consumers 
were exposed to ‘lack of access of concise and balanced sale and purchase information, 
unfavourable deals and contract terms; and denial of fair settlement terms.’251 These 
considerations should inform one’s interpretation of s 86(10). 
 
Although, Malan JA thoroughly discusses the aim of the debt review process, he does 
not discuss the particular aims of the provision.252 He correctly stated that purpose of the 
debt review process is ‘to achieve either a voluntary debt re-arrangement or a debt re-
arrangement by the Magistrates’ Court.’253 The learned judge went further to discuss the 
aims of the NCA but did not discuss how s 86(10) fosters the achievement of these aims 
and the purpose of debt review. He further differentiated the various sections by which 
debt review takes place, sections 83(3)(b), 87 or 85(a) and (b) from section 86.254 
Furthermore, that the s 86(10) right is applicable where the consumer is default and the 
parties fail to agree and do not amend the credit agreement in terms of s 116 or file a 
consent order as envisaged by s 86(8)(a) and a s 87 hearing will follow.255   Although 
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this assessment is correct, he does not identify what the purpose of s 86(10) is, which 
makes it impossible to determine if there is another means by which the purpose of the 
provision can be achieved. 
 
The court in Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus256 stated that s 86(10) serves four 
purposes. Firstly, it allows the credit provider to insist on timeous compliance by the 
debt counsellor.257 Secondly, it provides the debt counsellor with a period in which to 
complete the review process, the failure of which, affords the credit provider the right to 
pursue recovery proceedings.258 Thirdly, a s 86(10) notice sent to the National Credit 
Regulator affords it the means to monitor the proper functioning of the debt review 
system and the proper discharge of the debt counsellor’s statutory obligation as 
contained in s 129(1)(b). 259  Finally, the notice enables the consumer or the debt 
counsellor to bring an urgent application.260  
 
Malan JA in respect of the time line for the process, stated that neither does the NCA set 
a ‘time period within which the debt counsellor must make an application to the 
Magistrates’ Court nor does it require the process of debt restructuring to be completed 
within the period of 60 days after the application was made.’261 In light of this judgment, 
the provision serves three purposes that is, as a monitoring tool, an enabler for the 
consumer or the debt counsellor to bring an urgent application and a trigger for the credit 
provider’s enforcement mechanism. The question that follows is whether these purposes 
can be achieved in a different manner. 
 
Although Malan JA did not follow the interpretation process articulated in the Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund, the learned judge, albeit not adequately, considers all the 
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relevant aspects. His interpretation of the provision, although it balances the interests of 
the parties, is contrary to the purpose of debt review and the intention of the legislature 
in some respects. Although, his finding of the sound words of the provision is correct, it 
leads to absurd results. It leads to a complicated debt review process that in some cases 
result in the failure to achieve the purposes of the Act.  
 
3.1.2.6 Right of access to court. 
 
Malan JA’s judgment is a result of the fact that the case was not argued on a 
constitutional basis and did not take into account whether this interpretation affects the 
consumers’ constitutional rights. Malan JA stated that ‘in her affidavit opposing the 
application for summary judgment the appellant did not deal with the merits of the 
respondent’s case but only questioned the respondent’s right to have the action 
instituted’, which was the issue in Collet.262 As a result the case was not argued in terms 
of the Constitution. It is unfortunate that the later application to the Constitutional Court 
was rejected.263 It is submitted that s 86(10) in most cases impacts upon the consumers’ 
right of access to court. Its interpretation by the Supreme Court of Appeal exacerbates 
this further. 
 
The locus clasiscus on time limitation clauses is the constitutional court judgment of 
Barkhuizen v Napier.264 Ngcobo J (with Madala J, Nkabinde J, Skweyiya J, Van der 
Westuizen J and Yacoob J concuring) for the majority dismissed the appeal and ‘was 
unable to conclude that the 90-day period to the applicant to sue is so unreasonable that 
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its unfairness is manifest and that therefore its enforcement would be contrary to public 
policy.’265 The clause in question reads as follows:266 
‘If we reject liability for any claim made under this Policy we will be released from liability 
unless summons is served…. Within 90 days of repudiation.’ 
 
The court went further to state that clause in question ‘does not deny the applicant the 
right to seek judicial redress, it simply requires him to seek judicial redress within the 
period it prescribes failing which the respondent is released from liability’- this is the 
definition of a limitation clause.267 It is submitted that the interpretation of s 86(10) in 
Collet results in the provision falling within this definition thus warranting an analysis of 
whether the judgment adheres to this precedent. 
 
The court held that the proper approach to the constitutional challenges of contractual 
terms is to determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as 
evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights. 
This approach leaves room for the ‘doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the 
same time allows courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with 
constitutional values even though the parties may have consented to them’.268 The court 
considered the clause in question in light of s 34 of the Constitution, which guarantees 
the right to seek the assistance of the courts and stated that ‘our democratic order 
requires an orderly and fair resolution of disputes by courts or other independent and 
impartial tribunals and this is fundamental to the stability of an orderly society’.269 
Section 34 reflects the foundational values that underlie our constitutional order and 
constitutes public policy.270 The court further reiterated that our ‘courts have long held 
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that a term in a contract which deprives a party of the right to seek judicial redress is 
contrary to public policy’.271  
 
The main thrust of the argument on behalf of the applicant was that the clause limits the 
applicant’s right to seek judicial redress in court thus offends public policy.272 The court 
stated that this argument must be considered in light of the fact that time limitation 
clauses are common in both statutes and contracts and their effects are the same in both 
contexts.273 
 
The court stated that the applicable test in considering this question is the test set out in 
Mohlomi v Minister of Defence274 that is, whether a provision affords a claimant an 
adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress.275 The court in this case found two 
flaws in the provision in issue that together, rendered it unconstitutional. Firstly, it gave 
claimants ‘too short a time’ to give notice in the first place and to sue in the second.276 
Secondly, the provision was inflexible.277 
In order to determine whether the clause is contrary to public policy a determination of 
fairness and flexibility of the provision is considered. The court when determining 
whether the clause was fair asked two questions. Firstly, whether the clause itself is 
unreasonable and secondly, if the clause is reasonable, whether it should be enforced in 
the light of the circumstances that prevented compliance with the time limitation 
clause.278 The first question involves the weighing-up of two considerations. Firstly, 
public policy as informed by the Constitution (the consideration expressed in maxim 
pacta sunt servanda).279 This inquiry is directed at the objective terms of the contract.280 
The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded is a factor as it 
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will determine the weight that should be afforded to the values of freedom and dignity 
and the fact that all persons have the right to seek judicial redress. 281  The second 
question involves an inquiry into the circumstances that prevented compliance with the 
clause thus the onus is upon the party seeking to avoid the enforcement of the time 
limitation clause to provide such information.282 
 
Upon concluding this inquiry, the question remains whether, considering the 
circumstances of its conclusion, it still violates public policy. This stage of the inquiry is 
concerned with the reasonableness or otherwise of the period allowed by the clause, 
which must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the parties.283 The court 
referred to Mohlomi where it was observed that the harshness of the statutory provision 
in issue must be assessed in light of the realities that prevail in South Africa.284 The 
appellant in Collet did not request the court to consider this issue.  
 
In order to determine the impact of s 86(10) on the consumer’s right of access to court 
the issue of fairness must be determined. This addresses whether the clause itself is 
reasonable and if so, whether it should be enforced in light of the circumstances that 
prevented compliance with the time limitation clause. 285  In order to determine the 
provision’s fairness, which is an objective inquiry, one must consider public policy as 
informed by the Constitution. In this case, the legislation is reflection of the people’s 
will. On the other, that all persons have a right to seek judicial redress. 
 
The second question requires an analysis into the circumstances that prevent compliance 
with the clause, which is a subjective inquiry.286 The court correctly, stated that ‘it was 
unreasonable to insist on compliance with the clause if was impossible for the person to 
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comply with the time limitation clause’. 287  Further that ‘the onus is on the person 
seeking to avoid the enforcement of the time limitation clause’.288 Although not argued 
before the court, the postponements in Collet among other factors made it impossible for 
the appellant to obtain an order from the court within the requisite period. The 60 days is 
insufficient for the consumer to obtain a proposal by the debt counsellor, its acceptance 
or rejection by the credit provider(s) and finally, an order confirming or rejecting the 
debt restructuring proposal by the court. This conclusion is supported by the findings of 
the Statistics South Africa surveys conducted in 203 Magistrates’ Courts, which 
represent 98 per cent of all cases in South Africa, the results of which are depicted 
below:289 
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The findings of Statistics South Africa demonstrate the fact that the civil summons for 
debt in comparison to civil judgments are disproportionate- less than half of the cases 
resulted in a judgment. Percentage point representation per month of civil judgments in 
comparison to civil summonses for debt in comparison from January to November 
respectively are as follows: 45.45 per cent, 43.54 per cent 40 per cent 45 per cent, 40.11 
per cent, 40.26 per cent, 36.63 per cent, 32.06 per cent, 35.7 per cent, 35,6 per cent and 
39.5 per cent. The court in Barhuizen, stated that a consideration of the realties that 
prevail in South Africa is relevant in the enquiry.290 There are various reasons for these 
results, one of which is that South Africa’s court system is overburdened with criminal 
and civil matters.  An interpretation of s 86(10) that does not consider this does not 
adequately take into account the context of operation of the provision. 
 
Other research conducted on the debt review process identifies various obstacles. It can 
be said the parties to the process, individually contribute towards this. Although, the 
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research was conducted in January to April 2009, the findings provide insight into the 
industry and inform the interpretation of the provision. 
 
It was found that credit providers did not furnish the certificate of balance (‘COB’) 
within the requisite period of five days as provided for in regulation 24(4) of the 
NCA.291 As a result of the conduct of either the debt counsellor or the credit provider(s) 
25 per cent of COB requests were found not have been responded to.292 Out of 3 288 
credit agreements reviewed, only 1493 were included in the proposals, 350 responses to 
the same were predominantly negative responses.293 This resulted in the debt counsellors 
referring the matter to court without sending the proposals to the credit providers.294 It 
was found that the different systems utilised by debt counsellors resulted in huge 
differences and formats of the proposals leading to either its acceptance or rejection.295 
 
The average time from the date of application for the debt review process to the date the 
proposal was sent was found to be 58 days, leaving two days for the court to make an 
order before the credit provider can have the right to terminate the process in terms of s 
86(10).296 Furthermore, it was found that 59 per cent of the debt counsellors were of the 
view that the prescribed 60 day period was insufficient for the process and that the two 
main factors contributing to this was the non-cooperation of credit providers and that the 
process generally requires a longer period. 297   The non-cooperation of the credit 
providers was identified in relation to the acceptance or rejection of the proposal and the 
request for copies. 298  Research conducted identified that only 28.5 per cent of the 
requested copies were issued within two weeks, the remainder was issued within one 
                                                             
291  University of Pretoria ‘The debt counseling process: challenges to consumer and the credit industry in 
general: April 2009’ page 30. 
292 University of Pretoria op cit (n291) 31. 
293 Ibid. 
294 University of Pretoria op cit (n291) 32. 
295 University of Pretoria op cit (n291) 45. 
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month or more. 299  In addition, although not prescribed by either the NCA or its 
regulations, it was found that debt counsellors did not send out reminders to credit 
providers for non-compliance.300 It is submitted that such a reminder may positively 
affect the debt review process, as it would create a sense of urgency forcing the credit 
providers to participate. Furthermore, it was found that on a percentage point rating, debt 
counsellors rated credit providers’ good faith participation at 39 per cent, which has an 
impact on the outcome of the process and the stakeholder’s perception of the system.301  
 
Research identified that credit providers use the loopholes in the NCA to ensure that 
debt review matters are not heard on their true merits, by employing either the 
geographic or the monetary jurisdiction to oppose the matter.302  
 
Another obstacle to debt review was identified to be the debt counsellors’ inability to 
perform their functions efficiently, for example by making unacceptable or no proposals, 
which frustrates the debt review process.303  It was also found that in some cases credit 
providers reject ‘proposals even though the counter proposal repayment period is longer’ 
further frustrating the process and highlighting the importance of the key players being 
adequately equipped to perform their functions and meaningfully engaging in the 
process.304  
 
The major blockages to the debt review process are because of the actions or the lack 
thereof by the credit providers and debt counsellors. 305   Which begs the question, 
whether the consumer should bear the burden of the conduct of either the debt counsellor 
or credit provider. It is submitted that although the consumer could abuse the debt 
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review process, other means that do not cripple the process can be engaged in order to 
curb this. 
 
3.1.2.6.1 Inflexibility argument. 
  
The court in Barkhuizen further stated that the second flaw that the court found in 
Mohlomi was that the statutory provision involved was inflexible, it insisted on strict 
compliance regardless of how harsh this may have been in a particular case. 306  It 
considers whether, in all the circumstances of a particular case, having regard to the 
reasons for non-compliance with the clause, it would be contrary to public policy to 
enforce the clause.307 The party seeking to avoid the enforcement of the clause ought to 
demonstrate why its enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable in the given 
circumstances. 308  If a court finds that a time limitation clause does not afford a 
contracting party a reasonable and fair opportunity to approach a court, it will declare it 
to be contrary to public policy and therefore invalid.  Furthermore, where a claimant 
seeks to avoid the enforcement of a time limitation clause on the basis that the non-
compliance was caused by factors beyond its control, it is inconceivable that a court 
would hold the claimant to such a clause, for to do so would be contrary to public 
policy.309  
 
Section 86(10) stipulates that in the case where a consumer is in default and 60 days has 
lapsed since the application of the debt review, the credit provider may terminate the 
process. On a literal reading of the provision, once the credit provider satisfies the 
conditions contained therein, it acts within its right to terminate the debt review process 
in respect of that credit agreement, as such the provision does not consider the particular 
circumstances of a case, which may be harsh in some instances. The inquiry is, having 
                                                             
306 Barkhuizen  supra (n264) at 68. 
307 Barkhuizen  supra (n264) at 69. 
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regard to the facts of the present matter and in light of the fact that the reason for non-
compliance are factors beyond the consumer’s control, among them, the court’s roll 
being full, it would it be contrary to public policy.  
 
It submitted that still requiring compliance from the consumer in such a case might 
encourage the consumer to engage in self-help. This is in direct conflict with the right of 
access to courts in a constitutional state.310 
 
3.1.2.7 Good faith in South African law. 
 
Malan JA considered the concept of good faith in s 86(5) obligation alongside s 86(11) 
as the balancing factors of s 86(10) right. However, he did not articulate what conduct by 
the parties fulfills this requirement of good faith but stated that it is one of the reasons a 
court may grant an order for resumption of debt review in terms of s 86(11).  
 
The court in Barkhuizen found that the contention of the parties on whether the clause is 
enforceable regardless of how unfair or unjust raised difficult and complex questions 
concerning the development of the common law and the need to extend its applicable 
legal principles that seek to achieve justice and fairness to time limitation clauses.311 The 
court looked at the common law principle that states that law does not require people to 
do that which is impossible and good faith was implied in the operation of the clause 
countering the argument that the clause was inflexible and insisted on compliance even 
when this would be unjust.312 Whereas, the applicant submitted that the requirement of 
good faith is not part of our law, the court stated that the requirement of good faith in our 
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common law of contract underlies its contractual relations.313 When considering the s 
86(5) obligation and its enforceability, one must consider the views set out below:314  
‘[82] As the law currently stands, good faith is not a self-standing rule, but an underlying value 
that is given expression through existing rules of law.
 
In this instance, good faith is given effect to 
by the existing common law rule that contractual clauses that are impossible to comply with 
should not be enforced. To put it differently: “Good faith . . . has a creative, a controlling and a 
legitimating or explanatory function. It is not, however, the only value or principle that underlies 
the law of contracts.”
 
Whether, under the Constitution, this limited role for good faith is 
appropriate and whether the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia alone is sufficient to give effect 
to the value of good faith are, fortunately, not questions that need be answered on the facts of this 
case and I refrain from doing so.  
[83] While there is a compelling argument for the proposition that both the maxim lex non cogit 
ad impossibilia and the requirement of good faith should be applicable to the enforcement of time 
limitation clauses, the applicability of these common law principles will depend on the reason 
advanced for non-compliance. In the view I take of the facts, it is not necessary to reach any firm 
conclusion on whether the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia and the requirement of good faith 
may be applied to the enforcement of a time limitation clause.’ [My emphasis] 
 
In the case of Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Trasnet Ltd (which was refferred 
to  by the Constitutinal Court in  Everfresh Market Virgina (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd315), Ponnan AJA stated that our law on good faith accords with Australian law, 
which takes the view that certainty is the cornerstone of its enforceability by South 
African courts.316 The learned Judge discussed three categories in which good faith is 
employed as a part of negotiations and stated in which situation it would be 
enforceable.317 The case of debt review falls into the third categories which is as follows: 
‘The promise to negotiate in good faith will occur in the context of an arrangement (to use a 
neutral term) which by its nature, purpose, context, other provisions or otherwise makes it clear 
that the promise is too illusory or too vague and uncertain to be enforceable.’ 
 
The court further stated that for an agreement to agree to be legally enforceable it must 
provide for a dispute resolution mechanism to which the parties have bound 
themselves.318 
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The duty to negotiate in good faith appears in the debt review process, the nature of 
which requires that the parties engage in meaningful negotiations in order to reach a 
mutually beneficial agreement. The s 86(5) obligation as currently provided for in the 
process does not provide for a deadlock breaking mechanism thereby, making it illusory 
and vague. This view explains why the courts have struggled to definitively articulate 
what this obligation entails especially in respect of the credit provider. 
 
In the first place, the consumer should only apply for debt review if it meets the 
requirements for the application, that is, experiencing financial strain or the likelihood of 
it. Secondly, the debt counsellor ought to act in good faith by only accepting applications 
from consumers who meet the requirements of the debt review process and not those 
who are seeking a 60 days ‘payment holiday’. Thirdly, the credit provider ought to 
participate in the debt review process by responding timeously to the requests of the debt 
counsellor and not employing its s 86(10) right regardless of the circumstances of the 
case. This conduct by the parties is desirable, but is too illusory. One should not ignore 
the fact that for the debt counsellor this is a line of business, while for the credit provider 
the s 86(10) right is a mechanism to protect its investment. The possibility that the court 
could find that the credit agreement was in fact recklessly granted in terms of s 
87(1)(b)(i), is a loss for the credit provider, one which it would naturally seek to prevent.  
This influences the way the parties participate and perceive the process.  
 
It is submitted that Malan JA’s findings in Collet that the good faith requirement applies 
when the debt counsellor is assessing the consumer’s indebtedness, prospects for 
responsible debt restructuring, and in the reviews and negotiations was correct. 319 
However, the view that this requirement becomes more important upon the court 
ordering resumption in terms of s 86(11) cannot be supported.320 The court in Ferris v 
Firstrand Bank Ltd and Another was of the view that the good faith requirement is 
aimed at the parties reaching an agreement on debt restructuring before a debt 
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restructuring order is needed, once it is granted this requirement becomes irrelevant.321  
Although, the difference in the views by the courts in Collet and Ferris does not 
constitute a conflict, this deviation supports the views of this author.  
 
Concerning the good faith requirement, the court in Mercedes Benz Financial Services 
South Africa (Pty) Limited v Dunga did not define its precise ambit.322 The court stated 
that in the absence of special circumstances a termination of the debt review process 
while the consumer is pursuing it in good faith and in a reasonable manner would not 
constitute good faith. 323  In concluding, the court read into s 86(10) that the credit 
provider may only terminate a debt review if he is acting in good faith.324 This decision 
although it articulates the importance of the good faith requirement as most courts have, 
it does not clarify what it entails in this regard.  
 
The court in Seyffert & Seyffert v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a First National Bank 325 
attempted to provide some clarity when considering whether the credit provider had 
acted in good faith, by considering the appellant’s failure to present any realistic 
proposal to pay the debt.326 
 
Which begs the question why the court would engage in a balancing act of s 86(10) 
against the s 86(5) that is unenforceable, illusory and uncertain? Furthermore, what does 
this duty actually entail? It is submitted that the unenforceability of this obligation 
contributes towards the parties’ resistance to engage in meaningful negotiations that 
frustrates the debt review process, the success of which is hinged on efficient and 
meaningful negotiations between the parties. The inability to precisely define what this 
obligation entails further perpetuates this. 
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 It is submitted that the whole process of debt review demands good faith participation 
from the credit provider. The good faith requirement in the debt review process, 
although currently unenforceable, is required during the entire process from the time of 
application to issue of a clearance certificate to the consumer. This requirement is 
important during the time when the proposal and order are being granted by the court as 
the parties involved ought to meaningfully engage in order to reach an appropriate 
outcome. The credit provider’s participation in good faith during debt review allows this 
process to run smoothly and serve the purpose it ought to, namely to facilitate the debt 
restructuring of an over-indebted consumer. A mere rejection of the proposal by the 
credit provider as was seen in the Collet case should not be encouraged. The credit 
providers ought to have made constructive objections to the proposals in order to 
facilitate the resolution of the dispute. As van Heerden stated, the credit provider is not 
expected to engage in a cycle of counter proposal in this regard.327  
 
Had the credit provider participated in the debt review process meaningfully from the 
beginning it is probable that the Collet case would not have ended up in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, saving the court and all the parties time and resources. It is submitted 
that had the credit provider at least communicated why it had rejected the proposal, for 
example stated that the installments are too low, this would have at least alerted the debt 
counsellor of the shortfall in the proposal. This would grant the consumer and the debt 
counsellor an opportunity to revisit it before the referral to the court. Collet’s approach 
to s 86(10) encourages the credit provider to be a passive participant in the debt review 
process until the time that it can employ its s 86(10) right. This begs the question, what 
is the point of requiring that the credit provider partake in the process when it is not 
expected to do anything other than enforce its rights? It is submitted that Malan JA’s 
interpretation frustrates the debt review process and delays the benefits of having an out 
of court process conducted by debt counsellors. 
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3.2. Conclusion. 
 
It is submitted that s 86(10), as result of the interpretation in Collet, encourages the debt 
spiral, as it requires a consumer to employ debt counselling and legal services, which are 
costly, when it may be over-indebted. Furthermore, it does not encourage the application 
of the NCA, the Act is notorious for its complexity and unclear provisions, and the 
approach taken by court in Collet conforms to this viewpoint.  
 
The reality is that consumers who do not own assets are the ones who use credit the most 
and ‘unsecured lending is the most expensive form of debt’.328 It seems illogical to thus 
deprive them of the benefits of the NCA.  As a result, it is submitted that more attention 
should have been given to the First National Bank (‘FNB’) submission during the 
National Credit Bill hearing. Before the various cases concerning s 86(10), very little 
attention was paid to it and its implications were of no concern. FNB correctly stated 
that in the event that s 86(10) was not amended to allow the magistrate to conduct the 
debt review in s 86(11), thereby shortening the process there should be a distinction 
between consumers.329  The distinction was necessary because ‘big’ or rich customers 
could afford lawyers therefore they did not require as much protection as poor 
consumers.330  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry did not comment on this submission.331 However, 
during the discussion it was highlighted that FNB itself did not differentiate between the 
consumers and that many of the problems with credit related to poor people, as they did 
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not have enough money to protect themselves.332 The whole debt review process was 
formulated within this context. The reality is that credit providers will not come to the 
rescue of consumers as it is in their best interests not to do so. An understanding of how 
the credit market works makes it clear that credit providers make more money from 
consumers who cannot repay the debts as opposed to those who can. The interpretation 
of s 86(10) by Malan JA ignores this crucial fact. 
 
3.2.1 National Credit Amendment Act section 86(10). 
 
The NCA has been the subject of discussion in the legal, banking and parliamentary 
sectors because of its revolutionary nature the result of which has been amendments to 
the NCA. The National Credit Amendment Act in relation the debt review process aims 
to ‘to tighten measures relating to debt counsellor and conduct of their practices as debt 
counsellors’ and provides for s 86(10) as follows: 
(a) If a consumer is in default under a credit agreement that is being reviewed in terms of this section 
[86], the credit provider in respect of that credit agreement may, at any time at least 60 business 
days after the date on which the consumer applied for the debt review, give notice to terminate 
the review in the prescribed manner to- 
(i) The consumer, 
(ii) The debt counsellor; and 
(iii) The National Credit Regulator; and 
(b) No credit provider may terminate an application for debt review lodged in terms of this Act, if 
such application for review has already been filed in a court or in the Tribunal. 
 
The amendment of the section is indicative of the fact that the court’s findings in Collet 
did not adequately address the purposes and aims of the NCA. It is imperative that the 
amendments address the shortfalls of the Collet judgment if they are to meaningfully 
address the problems that the NCA sets out to remedy. Section 86(10)(b) acknowledges 
the fact that 60 business days is insufficient for a consumer to lodge an application for 
debt review with the debt counsellor and obtain an order from the court in respect 
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thereof. This amendment addresses the fact that the time limitation clause is inflexible 
and does not allow the consumer sufficient to time to achieve what is required of it. 
However, it neither encourages meaningful engagement nor adds clarity to what the duty 
to act in good faith requires of the parties. The section still provides for a termination of 
the process by the credit provider once 60 business days has lapsed without cause. 
Although, the amendment is likely to increase the chances of successful debt review, the 
dependence of the process on the court’s time and resources is not desirable and is in 
contrast to the legislature’s intention. Furthermore, this amendment although it remedies 
some of the obstacles, it has little or no impact on others, in particular the good faith 
requirement and the cost of legal services.  
 
Matters of over-indebtedness require drastic measures, an attempt to balance the parties 
rights although, admirable, it is unattainable. The findings in of the Changing Tides 17 
case in respect of the purpose of debt review stated above333 still stand, this begs the 
question whether there is a less intrusive means of achieving those purposes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the above discussion it is submitted that although s 86(10) plays an important 
role in ensuring that there is a balance of power between the consumer and credit 
provider(s), the problem however lies in the fact that the system of debt review is not 
functioning as envisioned by the drafters of the NCA. The NCA plays a central role in 
alleviating over-indebtedness, a plague that has affected majority of the South African 
population. Therefore, it is essential that s 86(10) must be interpreted in light of the 
Constitution and the NCA. This research discusses possible solutions to the current 
problem. Although this research is not based on empirical data, research conducted 
elsewhere (which should be conducted for the rest of the country) and facts evidenced in 
case law, demonstrate that the 60 business days provided for by s 86(10) is 
inadequate.334  
 
Regardless of which recommendation is implemented, there is a need to make provision 
for the consumer and debt counsellor’s withdrawal from the process and the automatic 
lapsing of the process. There is a need to provide for means by which the consumer and 
the debt counsellor may withdraw from the debt review process, at present only the 
credit provider has that right (s 86(10)).335  
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4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The most viable solution is one that allows debt review to take place without being 
detrimental to either the consumer or the credit provider. Most importantly, the solution 
must allow for the protection of the consumer, alleviation of over-indebtedness and 
curbing of the reckless granting of credit.  
 
4.2.1 REMOVAL OF SECTION 86(10). 
 
The removal of s 86(10) would allow the process to run uninterrupted and increase the 
chance of obtaining a debt restructuring proposal from debt counsellor and the eventual 
satisfaction of the debt. This would promote responsible granting of credit as the debt 
review process holds the credit provider liable for the granting of credit. Furthermore, 
this would provide for debt restructure in cases of over-indebtedness because the 
inadequacy of the 60 days period does not promote this aim. The removal of s 86(10) 
would take into account the fact that a consumer who is already in default is the perfect 
candidate for debt review. In such a case there is already proof of financial difficulties 
whereas if one is not yet in default it is questionable. In addition to this, a provision for 
the automatic lapsing of the debt review process in the event that there are no 
developments in the application should be made. 
 
However, the removal of s 86(10) would result in a power imbalance between the two 
parties, which the Act sought to rectify would still occur. It would allow for the 
possibility of consumers to abuse the debt review process, for example by not providing 
the required information to the debt counselor thereby prolonging the process. However, 
the automatic lapsing of the process and the effect of the debt review process on the 
consumer would balance this to an extent. 
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Upon weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the removal of the s 86(10), it is 
evident that its removal would best serve the purposes and aims of the NCA in the 
current circumstances. The existence of s 86(10) frustrates more of the NCA aims than 
its removal does. The existence of this provision would not be a cause for concern if the 
system envisioned by the drafters of the NCA was working accordingly. In light of the 
current obstacles facing the debt review process, this provision frustrates the 
achievement of the goals the Act. 
 
One must not ignore the fact that its removal would result in a power imbalance between 
the parties as such it is not desirable; but the level of indebtedness in the country is a 
cause for concern and has been stated as a cause of strikes on the platinum belt.336 
Although the removal of the section in the interim is not practical because legislation is 
enacted for the long term, it could allow the debt review process to contribute towards 
the alleviation of over-indebtedness until the levels of over-indebtedness have stabilised 
and can no longer be seen a plague affecting majority of the South African population. 
This action would be a compromise between the two extreme ends of the spectrum, the 
existence and the removal of s 86(10). It is submitted that this would be for the greater of 
the good of the country.  
 
4.2.2 AMENDING THE ACT. 
4.2.2.1 Section 86(6)(a). 
 
Section 86(6)(a) provides that: 
‘A debt counsellor who has accepted an application in terms of this section [86] must determine, 
in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time- 
(a) Whether the consumer appears to be over-indebted.’ 
 
It is submitted that the above stated section should be amended to provide that the debt 
counsellor should determine whether the consumer ‘is over-indebted’ and not ‘appears 
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to be over-indebted’. The evidentiary burden in regards this assessment is too lenient, it 
leaves room for abuse of the process by the consumer and the debt counselor. As the 
provision currently provides it seems as though the debt counsellor accepts any and 
every application, as the assessment requirement is too lenient.  
 
An amendment of the section to stating that prior to the debt counsellor accepting the 
application it should determine whether the consumer ‘appears to be over-indebted’ and 
upon, accepting the application it should determine whether the consumer is ‘over-
indebted’ would better serve the interests of the parties. The latter assessment would 
require a more rigorous inquiry than the former, which would prevent the over-
burdening of the judicial system and prevent abuse of the debt review process to an 
extent.  
 
The amendment would also be coupled with an amendment of s 86 to provide for a 
withdrawal from the process by consumer and the debt counsellor. 337  In addition, 
regulations stating the period in which the debt counsellor would discharge this 
evidentiary burden should be provided for. In respect of the assessment prior to the 
acceptance of the application, the regulations would provide for a shorter assessment 
period, as the debt counsellor would be using the information provided to it by the 
consumer. A longer assessment period would be provided for in order to allow the debt 
counsellor sufficient time to assess the information provided for by both the consumer 
and the credit provider(s). 
 
4.2.2.1 Section 86(11). 
 
The solution to the problem created by s 86(10) might also lie in an amendment of s 
86(11). Section 86(11) can be amended to provide for debt review by the court in the 
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case where a resumption of the process is ordered as opposed to referring the case back 
to the debt counsellor.338 This would be less cumbersome. At present, the matter is 
referred back to the debt counsellor and when the debt restructuring proposal is 
completed the matter is heard in court in order for it to be made an order of court. This 
would resolve (to an extent) the problem; however, the process would still be time and 
resource intensive. The process would still require that the consumer employ legal 
services, which the Act clearly sought to limit by providing that the debt review process 
predominantly takes place out of court. As such, it is not best suited to provide recourse 
for the majority of the consumers. 
 
Although not ideal, this amendment would increase the chances of the achievement of 
NCA aims that are currently frustrated by s 86(10).  As such, this amendment should 
occur only in the event that the amendments to s 86(10) discussed below do not take 
effect. 
4.2.2.2 Section 86(10) 
Increase in time frame of debt review 
 
A more viable solution would be the amendment of s 86(10) to provide for a longer 
period for debt review. Although not conclusive for the entire country, the research 
makes it clear that the 60 business days provided for by s 86(10) is insufficient to 
complete the debt review process and that 82 business days is a more realistic period.339  
In support of this finding, other research also found that it takes 58 days on average for a 
debt counsellor to complete a proposal leaving two days in which the preparation of a 
court application must take effect.340 Although, the completion of this application may 
be possible within the two days it is however not sustainable. Considering the time 
constraints of the process, it is understandable that debt counsellors would strategically 
refer the matter to the court before a response from the credit provider(s). An 
                                                             
338 National Credit Bill Hearing op cit (n 329). 
339 Roestoff  op cit (n334) 790. 
340 University of Pretoria op cit (n291) 34. 
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amendment providing for a longer period before the credit provider can enforce its s 
86(10) right would allow s 86 in its entirety to run as envisioned by the drafters of the 
NCA. It would allow the debt counsellor sufficient time to fulfill its role in the debt 
review process and forcing the credit provider(s) to participate meaningfully in the 
process thereby lessening the burden on the courts. This should be coupled with the 
requirement that the debt counsellor should provide proof that they have attempted to 
meaningfully engage with the credit provider before the referral to court. 
 
The 60 business days currently provided for in terms of s 86(10) although not prescribed 
by the NCA, allows for 30 business days in which the debt counsellor must determine 
whether the consumer appears to be over-indebted.341 In the case where the consumer is 
found not to be over-indebted and rejects the application, it must be advised of its right 
to approach the court directly within 20 business days. 342  The hearing before the 
magistrate and a rearrangement order in terms of s 87 must be finalised within the 
remaining ten business days. 343  It is submitted that these periods are not realistic 
considering the constraints faced in the debt review process and judicial system.  
 
90 business days would provide a sufficient time for the debt counsellor to perform his 
duties. This amendment would allow for more than 30 business days in which the debt 
counsellor ought to have completed the debt restructuring proposal. It is submitted that 
the 20 business days for referral to the court seems adequate, however the problem 
seems to be the court hearing the matter. As was seen in the Collet case, the hearing was 
set down for 10 June 2010 but was postponed to 12 August 2010 that is more than a 60 
days postponement (the period in which the entire process ought to be finalised).344 A 
breakdown of the period for each phase of the debt review process is beyond the scope 
of this research, however any amendment must take into account the backlog faced by 
the judicial system. An increase in the period for debt review process coupled with the 
                                                             
341 Wesbank a division of Firstrand Bank Ltd v Papier (with the NCR as Amicus Curriae) 2011 (2) SA 395 
(WCC) para 25. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Wesbank a division of Firstrand Bank Ltd supra (n 341) at 2. 
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meaningful engagement of the parties would increase the chances of successful debt 
restructuring by the debt counsellor without intervention by the courts. It could 
contribute towards preventing the debt counsellor referring the matter to the court before 
the credit provider’s involvement in the process. This would allow more consumers to 
access the remedy afforded to them by the Act. 
 
An amendment of the number of business days to 120 or 150 could be to the detriment 
of the credit providers because of the process’s effects on the enforcement of the credit 
agreement, resulting in a power imbalance contrary to the purpose and aims of the NCA. 
However, if this period would allow for the alleviation of over-indebtedness and curbing 
the reckless granting of credit, it should be effected. The possibility of abuse of the 
process by the consumer in this regard could be curbed by the inclusion of grounds for 
termination and granting an order for costs that are discussed below. 
 
Section 86(10) has been amended to restrict the termination of the process to the cases 
that have not been referred to the court that better serves the NCA’s aims. However, it is 
questionable whether this amendment will remedy of the effects of this limitation clause. 
This amendment allows for the hearing of more debt review matters by the court, 
however, it does not encourage meaningful engagement by all the parties culminating in 
a viable debt rearrangement proposal. It encourages the debt counsellor and the 
consumer to preempt the credit provider’s response to the debt rearrangement proposal 
and encourages the referral of the matter to the court before its engagement in order to 
have the matter heard by the court. The results of which is a flooding of the court’s roll 
of such matters, which is contrary to the legislature’s aims. 
 
Ground for termination. 
 
In addition to an increase in the period, it is proposed that an inclusion of grounds for the 
termination would better serve the interests of justice and fulfills the purpose and aims of 
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the Act. The consumer or the debt counsellor’s failure to act in good faith is a ground for 
termination that is acceptable in the light of the purposes and aims of the Act.345  
 
Section 86(10) merely makes provision for unilateral termination of the debt review 
process without any reason, as long as 60 business days lapsed and the consumer is in 
default.  As such even when the credit provider does not cooperate, it can still invoke 
this right. Although, there resumption of the process may be ordered, such conduct 
frustrates the debt review process and achievement of the aims of the NCA. This 
amendment would rectify such conduct. 
 
Various courts have considered the requirement of good faith participation by the parties 
in the debt review as discussed above and have attempted to articulate what that duty 
entails, however, the unenforceability of the good faith obligation in the debt review 
hinders such efforts. An amendment of s 86(10) to state that the credit provider can only 
exercise this right if it acted in good faith will address the concerns discussed. Such an 
amendment should be coupled with an amendment of the s 86(5)(b) good faith 
obligation to ensure its enforceability as was discussed above.346 
 
An order for costs. 
 
In the event that the s 86(11) amendment allowing the court to conduct the debt review 
is not implemented, s 86(10) should be amended to state that in the event that the court 
orders a resumption of the debt review process, an order for costs should be made. The 
court would grant this order in favour of the consumer when it is over-indebted or when 
the court finds that the credit was recklessly granted. Such an order should also be 
                                                             
345 The court in Mercedes Benz Financial Services South Africa  supra (n322) at 52 read into s 86(10) that 
the credit provider could only terminate the debt review process if it had participated in good faith.  
346 See further Chapter 3. In order to make the good faith requirement enforceable, the legislature could 
make provision for a dead lock breaking mechanism for example a tribunal to determine whether the 
parties acted in good faith. 
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granted where either party is found to not have been acting in good faith. If the court 
finds that the consumer is not to be over-indebted, it would grant an order in favour of 
the credit provider. If the court finds that the debt counsellor’s conduct or lack thereof 
frustrated the debt review, the court would grant an order for costs against it. 
  
This would take into account the fact that the judicial process is expensive and had the 
parties acted in good faith, the debt review process could have played its role in ensuring 
the eventual satisfaction of the debt without extensive involvement of the court or legal 
practitioner. This would serve as deterrent, punishing credit providers, debt counsellors 
or consumers whose conduct frustrates the aims and purposes of the Act. Furthermore, it 
would force the parties to take the process seriously and hold them accountable for their 
actions. 
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